Canada’s Refugee Health Law and Policy from a Comparative, Constitutional, and Human Rights Perspective by Dhand, Ruby (rdhand) (author) & Diab, Robert (rdiab) (author)
351(2015) 1 CJCCL
Canada’s Refugee Health Law 
and Policy from a Comparative, 
Constitutional, and Human Rights 
Perspective
Ruby Dhand* & Robert Diab**
Under the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP), Canada has provided healthcare 
coverage for immigrants in fi nancial need, including refugees, for over half a century. 
Until recently, the program provided migrants with comparable coverage to that 
available to Canadians on social assistance. In 2012, the government amended the 
IFHP to signifi cantly reduce coverage for certain classes of migrants, including some 
on the basis of their country of origin, and removed coverage from others altogether. 
Th is article briefl y describes the changes in migrant healthcare coverage in Canada, 
and compares it with analogous coverage in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia. Th e comparison demonstrates that Canada’s recent changes to healthcare 
coverage fall below a common standard of coverage in these comparator countries. Th e 
paper then explores arguments made for and against the constitutionality of the revised 
IFHP in Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada, and the consistency of the plan 
with Canada’s obligations under international human rights law. Th e authors contend 
that despite the reluctance of courts thus far to recognize a positive duty on the part of 
the state to provide health benefi ts as a means of protecting Charter rights, facets of this 
case present unique and compelling reasons for doing so. Finally, the paper argues that 
restoring coverage to levels prior to 2012 would bring Canada in closer conformity to 
the values and principles expressed in various international human rights treaties. 
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I.  Introduction
Following the Second World War, Canada began to off er healthcare coverage for certain groups of immigrants brought to Canada with 
government assistance. It did so through a series of orders in council that 
gradually expanded the scope of coverage to all classes of immigrants who 
could not aff ord coverage independently. 1 Coverage for migrants in the 
early stages of their arrival has thus been generally provided not through 
provincial healthcare plans but through what has become known as the 
Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP).2 
Until 2012, the program provided refugees, refugee claimants, and 
other migrants with comparable coverage to that available to Canadians 
 contributions as research assistants.
1. Th e history of the program is explored in greater detail in Part II.
2. As explored below, for certain periods, provincial and territorial health 
plans have off ered coverage for certain classes of migrants that overlapped 
with eligibility under the IFHP.
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receiving social assistance. 3 Th is included coverage for non-emergency 
hospital and doctor visits, vaccines and other preventive medicine, and 
basic dental and eye care. In June of 2012, the government amended 
the IFHP to signifi cantly reduce coverage for certain classes of refugees 
and refugee claimants, including some on the basis of country of origin. 4 
Th e government also removed coverage from other categories of migrants 
altogether.5 Coinciding with this, Parliament passed a series of legislative 
amendments to the process for refugee determination under the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 6 with a more expeditious means 
of resolving claims by migrants from certain “Designated Countries of 
Origin” that had higher historical rates of failed claims. 7
Under the revised 2012 IFHP, those previously eligible for a wide 
range of basic health benefi ts have been divided into four tiers of 
coverage, with all but 14 percent of those eligible for coverage now placed 
in the three lower tiers. 8 Th ose in the fi rst tier continue to enjoy coverage 
previously available, while those in the second tier are covered for visits 
to doctors or hospitals only if the matter is “of an urgent or essential 
3. Government of Canada, “Health care – Refugees”, online: Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/outside/
arriving-healthcare.asp> [“Health care - Refugees”].
4. Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, 2012, SI/2012-
26, (2012) C Gaz II, online: Justice Laws Canada <http://laws-lois.
justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SI-2012-26/FullText.html>. Th e order was 
registered on April 25, 2012 and came into force on June 30, 2012.
5. Ibid. 
6. SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
7. Bill C-31, Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, 1st Sess, 41st 
Parl, 2012 (assented to 28 June 2012) [Bill C-31]. For an overview of 
the amendments in Bill C-31, see Government of Canada, “Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System”, online: Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/reform.asp>. 
8. Government of Canada, “Interim Federal Health Program: Summary of 
Benefi ts”, online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.
cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/outside/summary-ifhp.asp> [“Summary of 
Benefi ts”]. Th e proportion of claimants in each tier is documented in 
the Memorandum of the Attorney General of Canada and Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration, at paras 13-15 [Respondents’ 
Memorandum] in CDRC, CARL, Garcia, Rodriquez et al v Canada (AG 
and MCI), Federal Court fi le T-356-13 [CDRC et al v Canada]; the trial 
level decision in this case is explored in more detail below.
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nature,”9 and for medicine or vaccines “only if needed to prevent or treat 
a disease that is a risk to public health or to treat a condition of public 
safety concern.”10 Th ose in the third tier are provided the same coverage 
as those in the second tier with the exception that hospital and doctor 
visits are covered not where urgent or essential but only where necessary 
to “diagnose or treat a disease posing a risk to public health or to treat 
a condition of public safety concern.”11 Failed claimants and migrants 
awaiting a pre-removal risk assessment are now placed in a fourth tier in 
which previous eligibility under the IFHP has been removed altogether 
(i.e. even if they suff er a condition that poses a risk to public health or 
safety).12 Th e new scheme allows for discretionary coverage in individual 
cases, but limits their placement in this instance to either the second 
or third-tier of coverage. Th e new framework thus entails an eff ective 
withdrawal of coverage for most forms of preventive and, in many cases, 
emergency care for some 86 percent of migrants who previously enjoyed 
coverage. 
Part II of this article briefl y explores the history and scope of the 
IFHP, and then describes the changes in Canada’s migrant healthcare 
coverage and their practical impact. Part III compares Canada’s coverage 
with analogous plans in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia. Drawing on this overview, we argue that while various 
impediments to healthcare can be found in these other jurisdictions, for 
the most part, Canada’s revised plan falls below a common standard of 
coverage among these comparator countries.
In Part IV, we explore the constitutionality of the revised IFHP and 
its consistency with Canada’s obligations under international human 
rights law. We do so by exploring arguments raised in an action brought 
by two individual immigrants directly aff ected by the changes, along with 
the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers and Canadian Doctors for 
Refugee Care (the Applicants).13 Among the central issues in this case is 
whether the decision to remove coverage from certain classes of migrants 
9. “Summary of Benefi ts”, ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. CDRC et al v Canada, supra note 8.
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violates sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, 14 and if so whether the decision constitutes a reasonable limit 
on those rights under section 1. In making these claims, the Applicants 
invited the Court to depart from a growing body of case law in which 
courts have resisted recognizing a positive state duty under the Charter 
to provide a benefi t essential for security of the person or for survival, 
including healthcare. 15 Th e Applicants relied in part on the Supreme 
Court’s affi  rmation in Gosselin v Quebec 16 that the Charter might be 
applied in this way under “special circumstances.” In July 2014, Mactavish 
J of the Federal Court rendered a decision at the trial level, dismissing the 
section 7 claim, but fi nding the revised IFHP scheme contrary to sections 
12 and 15, and not a reasonable limit on those rights under section 1 
of the Charter. 17 Setting out an overview of this decision, we highlight 
relevant factual fi ndings under sections 12 and 15 that are likely to frame 
the reconsideration of the case on appeal. We also argue that in dismissing 
the section 7 claim, Mactavish J failed to recognize facets of the present 
case that distinguish it from earlier case law on the question of a positive 
duty under section 7. For reasons to be explored, we suggest that the 
present facts come closer than earlier case law to presenting the “special 
circumstances” that the majority in Gosselin contemplated as necessary 
to justify the imposition of a positive duty under section 7. Finally, the 
14. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
15. Th ese include Masse v Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social 
Services) (1996), 134 DLR (4th) 20 (Div Ct) [Masse], leave to appeal to 
CA refused, [1996] OJ No 1526 (QL), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 
[1996] SCCA No 373; Clark v Peterborough Utilities Commission (1995), 
24 OR (3d) 7 (Gen Div), appeal dismissed as moot (1998), 40 OR 
(3d) 409 (CA); Auton (Guardian ad litem of ) v British Columbia (AG), 
2004 SCC 78 [Auton]; Grant v Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 77 
OR (3d) 481 (SC) [Grant]; Wynberg v Ontario (2006), 82 OR (3d) 561 
(CA) [Wynberg]; Sagharian v Ontario (Education), 2008 ONCA 411 
[Sagharian]; Flora v Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2008 ONCA 538 
[Flora]; CCW v Ontario Health Insurance Plan (2009), 95 OR (3d) 48 
(Div Ct) [CCW]; Tanudjaja v Attorney General (Canada) (Application), 
2013 ONSC 5410 [Tanudjaja].
16. Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84 [Gosselin].
17. Canadian Doctors For Refugee Care v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 
651 [Canadian Doctors].
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paper briefl y examines relevant international human rights law that may 
assist in a Charter analysis of the issues raised in this case.
II.  Nature of the Change to Refugee Health   
 Coverage
A.  Context for the Program
To place the nature and import of the recent changes to refugee health 
coverage into context, we begin with a brief overview of the origins and 
scope of Canada’s healthcare scheme for immigrants before 2012. 18
Th e Interim Federal Health Program can be traced to a 1946 Order 
in Council that authorized medical coverage for some 4,000 ex-members 
of the Polish Armed Forces whom the federal government had selected 
for assistance with immigration.19 In 1949, through a further order, the 
government extended coverage to immigrants generally, authorizing the 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration “to pay hospital accounts 
and maintenance expenses of immigrants who may become suddenly ill 
after being admitted at the port of entry and prior to their arrival at 
destination, in such cases where immigrants lack the fi nancial resources 
to bear these expenses themselves.”20 In 1952, the plan was extended 
to cover the costs of “medical and dental care, hospitalization, and any 
expenses incidental thereto” not only to indigent immigrants in need 
of care upon entry or arrival at destination, but also to those waiting 
for work placements to begin.21 And in 1957, a further order amended 
the scheme to extend coverage more generally to “a person who at any 
time is subject to Immigration jurisdiction or for whom Immigration 
18. Th e following account draws upon a summary of the origins of the IFHP 
in Toussaint v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FC 810 at paras 31-39 
[Toussaint]; Memorandum from Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care et al, 
at paras 4-17 [Applicants’ Memorandum] in CDRC et al v Canada, supra 
note 8; Mactavish J’s decision in Canadian Doctors, ibid at paras 32-56.
19. Toussaint, ibid at para 32, citing Order in Council PC 1946-3112 of July 
23, 1946.
20. Ibid at para 34, citing Order in Council PC 1949-41/3888 of August 4, 
1949.
21. Ibid at para 35, citing Order in Council PC 1949-4/3263 of June 6, 
1952.
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authorities feel responsible.”22 Th e 1957 order would continue to be the 
primary authority for the program rather than being entrenched in later 
immigration or healthcare legislation.23 
Prior to 2012, the program off ered immigrants a level of health 
coverage roughly equivalent to that provided to citizens or permanent 
residents on social assistance.24 Th is included coverage for hospital and 
doctor visits and prescriptions, as is generally the case under provincial 
plans; but it also covered certain dental procedures and limited eye care, 
as in some plans for those receiving social assistance.25 In these latter 
respects, it off ered benefi ts not available to working citizens or permanent 
residents under most provincial plans. Coverage was also meant to last for 
a limited and short duration, until a person began working or obtained 
eligibility under provincial or territorial programs.26
Until 1995, the bulk of IFHP funding was spent on care for 
“indigent landed immigrants,” but this began to shift in 1995 to “refugee 
claimants, refugees, and others in humanitarian need.”27 In 1995 and 
1996, Ontario and Quebec, respectively, ceased to provide coverage for 
refugee claimants under their plans.28 Th is caused not only a shift in 
the balance of funding between refugees and non-refugees, but also a 
signifi cant rise in the number of qualifi ed persons falling within the scope 
of the IFHP.29 In 1999, the scope of coverage under the plan was further 
extended to include applicants seeking a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment 
and victims of human traffi  cking.30 By 2012, the program serviced a 
22. Ibid at para 36, citing Order in Council PC 1957-11/848 of June 20, 
1957.
23. Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 10.
24. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 10; “Health care - 
Refugees”, supra note 3.
25. Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 8, relying upon the 
Affi  davit of Sonia Le Bris, sworn August 29, 2013, Acting Director of 
Migration Health Policy and Partnerships, Health Branch, CIC at paras 
7-13 [Le Bris Affi  davit].
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid at para 12, citing Le Bris Affi  davit at paras 18-21.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
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larger number of immigrants (some 126,000 persons, by one estimate),31 
and also covered them for a longer average period – close to three years 
in the government’s estimate.32 Th e cost of reimbursement to hospitals, 
doctors, and other providers, along with medication and other fees rose 
signifi cantly. In 1996-97, the IFHP cost $18 million and by 2011-12 it 
was $83 million.33
Yet, as litigants challenging the validity of changes to the scheme have 
noted, from a broader perspective, the cost of the program was relatively 
low. It carried an annual per-capita cost of $552 or roughly 10 percent of 
the annual per capita cost of healthcare for Canadians of $5,401.34 Th e 
Applicants also note that the $83 million cost of the program comprises 
“only 4/100ths of one percent of total health expenditures in Canada, or 
about 60 cents per taxpayer per year.”35
Prior to changes in 2012, the IFHP provided the same suite of 
coverage to various classes of immigrants, including pending, successful, 
and failed refugee claimants, along with government and privately 
sponsored refugees, and those awaiting a pre-removal risk assessment. 
Coverage lasted until a person became eligible under a provincial plan 
or departed from Canada.36 However, as the government has indicated 
in the course of litigation, the earlier IFHP did not apply to persons 
without status in Canada, or to persons with failed or abandoned or 
ineligible claims who had not sought a pre-removal risk assessment. On 
this basis, the government has argued that the 2012 revision to the IFHP 
did not introduce a distinction in terms of coverage among migrants.
31. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 14, citing the Affi  davit 
of Allison Little Fortin, sworn August 29, 2013, Director of the IFHP, 
Health Branch, CIC at para 8 [Little Fortin Affi  davit].
32. Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 13, citing Little Fortin 
Affi  davit at para 75 and Le Bris Affi  davit at para 39.
33. Ibid.
34. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 8, citing the Affi  davit of 
Mitchell Goldberg at para 18.
35. Ibid, citing Le Bris Affi  davit at para 39.
36. Ibid at para 7, citing Government of Canada, “Audit of the Control 
Framework for the Interim Federal Health Program” (2004), online: 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
resources/audit/ifh.asp>. 
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B.  Changes to the IFHP in 2012
By an order in council on April 25 of 2012, which came into eff ect on 
June 30, 2012, the government shifted its policy with respect to coverage 
signifi cantly.37 Coverage would now be tiered, placing immigrants into 
four categories, with those in the second and third tiers losing many of 
the benefi ts and services they enjoyed earlier, and those in the fourth 
losing all. In response to criticism of the new scheme, the government 
passed an order in council on June 18, 2012, restoring some benefi ts 
to persons in the second and third tier.38 What follows summarizes the 
current plan.39
Th e fi rst tier of coverage, referred to in the government documentation 
as “Expanded Health-Care Coverage,” applies to government-assisted 
refugees, privately sponsored refugees who receive income support 
through the Resettlement Assistance Program (or its Quebec equivalent), 
and to victims of human traffi  cking for the duration of the period in 
which they hold a “Temporary Resident Permit.”40 Persons in this group 
receive the equivalent level of coverage to what the program off ered to 
all immigrants prior to 2012. Th is includes hospital and doctor services; 
laboratory, diagnostic, and ambulance services; and also “supplemental 
health benefi ts,” such as prescribed medications, limited dental and 
vision care, prosthetics, home care, and psychological counselling. As the 
government’s brief in the current Charter challenge notes, this tier of 
coverage extends to 14 percent of IFHP benefi ciaries.41
Th e second tier, titled “Health Care Coverage,” applies to privately 
sponsored refugees not receiving government income support (or the 
bulk of privately sponsored refugees), and “Other Protected Persons,”42 
until they qualify for provincial or territorial coverage. “Other Protected 
Persons” include refugee claimants not from a Designated Country of 
37. Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, supra note 4.
38. Order Amending the Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, 
PC 2012-945, (2012) C Gaz II (of 28 June 2012).
39. “Summary of Benefi ts”, supra note 8.
40. Ibid.
41. Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 35, citing Little Fortin 
Affi  davit at paras 47-55.
42. “Summary of Benefi ts”, supra note 8.
360 
 
Dhand & Diab, Canada’s Refugee Health Law and Policy
Origin (see below for the defi nition); refugees whose claims have been 
accepted; immigration detainees; and persons who have received a 
positive Pre-Removal Risk Assessment. Th is tier provides the following 
services “only if of an urgent or essential nature”: hospital, physician, 
or nurse services; laboratory, diagnostic and ambulance services; and 
medication or vaccine “only if needed to prevent or treat a disease that is 
a risk to public health or to treat a condition of public safety concern.”43 
As a result, persons in this group are no longer covered in the ordinary 
course for prescription medication including insulin, anti-epileptics, 
anti-asthma or psychiatric medication.44 Th e government’s factum notes 
that 62 percent of all IFHP benefi ciaries (i.e. of persons in the fi rst three 
tiers) fall within this category.45
Th e third tier is comprised of refugee claimants from a “safe” or 
Designated Country of Origin (DCO)46 and rejected claimants.47 
Persons in this group receive what is termed “Public Health or Safety 
Health-Care Coverage,” which provides the same coverage as in the 
second tier except that whereas in that category, the listed services aside 
from medications and vaccines (i.e. hospital and doctor visits, diagnostic 
and ambulance services) are covered only where they are of “an urgent or 
43. Ibid.
44. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 10.
45. Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 36, citing Little Fortin 
Affi  davit at paras 56-61.
46. Following amendments in Bill C-31 to the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act in June 2012, the Minister may designate a source country 
to be “safe,” triggering an accelerated process for determining refugee 
claims, along with the tiered health coverage described above. See s 58 
of Bill C-31, supra note 7, amending s 12 of Bill C-11, An Act to Amend 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Federal Courts Act, 3rd 
Sess, 40th Parl, 2010 (assented to 29 June 2010). Th irty-seven countries 
have been deemed safe, including Hungary and Mexico – which are, as 
the Applicants in this case note, a source of signifi cant numbers of refugee 
claimants in recent years.
47. A rejected claimant is defi ned as a person whose claim has been rejected 
by the Immigration and Refugee Board and whose right to judicial review 
and appeal of that right have been exhausted: Government of Canada, 
“Information Sheet for Interim Federal Health Program Benefi ciaries”, 
online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/refugees/outside/ifhp-info-sheet.asp>.
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essential nature,” here both medicine or vaccines and other health services 
are provided “only if needed to diagnose, prevent or treat a disease posing 
a risk to public health or to diagnose or treat a condition of public safety 
concern.”48 Th is category entails no coverage for preventive care, and no 
medication or services except where a condition poses a risk to public 
health or safety. Th us, it excludes coverage for any disorder that is non-
communicable, including diabetes, asthma, epilepsy, heart conditions, 
trauma, blood infections, non-violent psychoses, and pregnancy.49 
Twenty-four percent of IFHP benefi ciaries are within this category.50
Finally, a fourth group comprises refugee claimants who have 
withdrawn or abandoned their claims or have not been found eligible 
to make a claim, along with applicants for a pre-removal risk assessment 
without a valid claim. Prior to June of 2012, persons in this group were 
covered by the IFHP while awaiting the outcome of a pre-removal risk 
assessment (PRRA).51 Th ey now receive no coverage under the IFHP, 
even if their condition poses a risk to public health or safety.52 
To be clear as to the nature of the diff erence between the plan before 
and after the June 2012 changes, it might help to consider a common 
practical scenario. Both before and since 2012, refugee claims brought 
by migrants from certain DCO countries such as Mexico and Hungary 
have been refused in a number of cases, but at least some have been 
successful.53 Th us, for example, prior to 2012, if a pregnant woman were 
to arrive from a DCO country with a valid and compelling claim for 
asylum, she would receive coverage for routine visits to a doctor for pre-
natal care and medicine. Today, falling under the third tier of coverage, 
she would not be covered for routine visits or medicine, given that she 
48. “Summary of Benefi ts”, supra note 8.
49. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 10.
50. Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 37, citing Little Fortin 
Affi  davit at paras 62-70.
51. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 10.
52. “Summary of Benefi ts”, supra note 8; Applicants’ Memorandum, ibid; 
Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 26, citing Little Fortin 
Affi  davit at para 82.
53. Th e DCO category is premised on a higher rate of failed claims from 
these countries, but not on an absolute rate of failure or a prohibition on 
claims from DCO migrants.
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does not suff er from a potentially communicable disease or a condition 
that poses a danger to public safety. 
But even once a fi nding is made at the Immigration and Refugee Board 
that a pregnant woman from a DCO is a successful refugee claimant, she 
would only move up to the second tier of coverage. Th us, she would still 
not be covered for a routine visit to a doctor or for medication, since 
the second tier covers visits only of an “urgent or essential nature,” and 
medicine only where it is necessary to treat a communicable disease or a 
condition that poses a danger to public safety. In short, the plan removes 
coverage for many preventive forms of medicine that are necessary to 
address matters short of emergencies but critical for life or security of 
the person. 
In responding to the constitutional challenge to the changes to 
the IFHP, the government questioned the severity of the situation 
in which persons in the lower three tiers now fi nd themselves. Citing 
the availability of a range of provincial social welfare programs, such as 
Ontario Works, and signifi cant numbers of community health centres 
that provide free health services, the government suggested that the loss 
of IFHP coverage can often be addressed by other means.54 It also cited 
evidence that a number of provinces had expanded their healthcare plans 
in response to the IFHP reforms, including Quebec, which provides 
aff ected persons much of what was reduced under the 2012 reforms.55 
And in the last resort, the Respondents noted that emergency medical 
care at any hospital is available to everyone in Canada unconditionally. 56
54. Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at paras 40-41, citing Little 
Fortin Affi  davit at paras 89-92, 94.
55. Ibid at para 44.
56. Ibid at para 44, citing Little Fortin Affi  davit at para 92. Note, however, 
that in the 2011 Federal Court of Appeal decision in Toussaint v Canada 
(Attorney General), 2011 FCA 213 at para 59 [Toussaint Appeal], the 
Crown disputed whether the exclusion of an undocumented migrant 
from coverage under the IFHP deprived access to emergency care on the 
basis that “in Ontario, where the appellant lives, hospitals cannot deny 
emergency medical treatment to anyone, when to do so would endanger 
life”: Public Hospitals Act, RSO 1990, c P 40. Yet, at the trial level, Justice 
Zinn had found, supra note 18 at para 91, that “the applicant’s exclusion 
from IFHP coverage has exposed her to a risk to her life as well as to 
long-term, and potentially irreversible, negative health consequences,” 
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In the Federal Court’s decision in Canadian Doctors, Mactavish J 
accepted the Appellants’ contention that these various sources remain 
inadequate to address the critical needs of many migrants.57 Refugee 
claimants generally do not qualify for provincial healthcare plans due to 
residency requirements and varying defi nitions of residency in provincial 
legislation. 58 Some refugee claimants, failed claimants, and Pre-Removal 
Risk Assessment applicants are eligible for provincial social assistance, 
but these provide supplemental benefi ts (medication, dental and eye care) 
rather than the comprehensive care normally provided under primary 
provincial healthcare plans.59 Moreover, due to sponsorship undertakings, 
privately-sponsored refugees are precluded from obtaining social 
assistance for a year after their arrival, and claimants from Designated 
Countries of Origin are not eligible for a work permit for the fi rst 180 
days in Canada.60 In other words, it is not clear how many refugees are 
expected to address a lack of coverage for critical or emergency assistance. 
Justice Mactavish held that, in a broader sense, the government’s 
position on alternative sources of care “takes no account of the extreme 
human cost incurred as individuals search for sources of potentially 
life-saving medical care.”61 Many claimants face language barriers or 
have limited education, posing further impediments to access.62 Justice 
Mactavish was also critical of the assumption that community health 
centres or refugee centres could function as a surrogate for the wide range 
of walk-in care that would otherwise have been available under the IFHP, 
amounting to a deprivation of security of the person under section 7. 
Th e Federal Court of Appeal upheld this fi nding at para 66, despite 
overturning the lower court decision on other grounds. See below for 
further discussion of both decisions.
57. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at paras 261-99.
58. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 15 (see e.g. the defi nition 
of “residency” in section 1.1 of RRO 1990, Reg 552 of Ontario’s Health 
Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c H6 [Regulation 552], the defi nition of 
“resident” in section 1 of the British Columbia Medicare Protection Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 286 and the defi nition of “deemed residency” in section 2 
of the Medical and Health Care Services Regulation, BC Reg 426/97).
59. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 15.
60. Ibid. 
61. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 263.
62. Ibid at para 266.
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given the “severely restricted” medical assistance typical in these essentially 
charitable institutions.63 She also noted that neither emergency care nor 
the limited coverage available through social assistance could provide 
for a wide range of preventive care through routine doctor visits, pre-
natal care, or diagnostic tests.64 Finally, the availability of discretionary 
coverage was also a poor substitute for a range of reasons that include 
the exclusion in such cases of coverage for medication, the inability to 
address emergency situations, the confusion surrounding knowledge of 
how to apply, and the general uncertainty as to whether one could obtain 
discretionary coverage.65
III. Refugee Health Coverage in a Comparative   
 Perspective
Before examining the merits of the revised IFHP in terms of the Charter 
and Canada’s obligations under international human rights law, in this 
section we briefl y survey the extent of coverage in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia. Th e overview demonstrates that while 
migrants face obstacles to healthcare coverage or treatment in these 
comparator countries, with one exception, Canada’s revised IFHP falls 
below a basic level of coverage common to each of them for both refugee 
claimants and failed or non-status migrants. 
A.  Th e United States 
Healthcare services are provided to refugees and asylum seekers through 
the Offi  ce of Refugee Resettlement, which is overseen by the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services.66 Th e Offi  ce administers 
63. Ibid at para 273.
64. Ibid at paras 277-81.
65. Ibid at paras 287-93.
66. US migration law distinguishes “refugees” from “asylees.” Refugees are 
individuals who seek asylum status from outside of the United States, 
while asylees do so from within. We refer to both in what follows as 
“refugee claimants.” For a summary of the benefi ts available through 
programs administered by the Offi  ce of Refugee Resettlement, see US, 
Offi  ce of Refugee Settlement, “Fact Sheet: ORR BENEFITS-AT-A-
GLANCE”, online: An Offi  ce of Administration for Children & Families 
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/fi les/orr/orr_fact_sheet_benefi ts_
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the Refugee Medical Assistance program to claimants, regardless of their 
status for up to eight months. Th is federally-funded program provides 
coverage from the time a claimant enters the United States and meets the 
requirements to fi le a claim, or is granted status by either US Citizenship 
and Immigration Services or the Offi  ce of Refugee Resettlement.67
Under the Refugee Medical Assistance program, refugee claimants are 
provided access to emergency and non-emergency care found “medically 
necessary.”68 Once coverage under the program expires, those who meet 
immigration status requirements under the Aff ordable Care Act69 have 
access to Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, 70 and other 
healthcare coverage options.71 “Mandatory benefi ts” under the federal 
Medicaid program provide refugee claimants with coverage that includes 
“inpatient and outpatient hospital services; early, periodic, screening, 
diagnostic and treatment services, nursing facility services; home health 
services, physician services; [and] rural health services.” 72 
Th e United States thus off ers a higher level of basic healthcare 
coverage to refugee claimants than Canada does, and it also does so 
without distinction on the basis of country of origin. Moreover, in 
at_a_glance.pdf>.
67. “Access to Care” (2011), online: Refugee Health Technical Assistance 
Center <http://refugeehealthta.org/access-to-care/>. 
68. See State Letter #04-12 from Nguyen Van Hanh, PhD, Director, Offi  ce 
of Refugee Resettlement (18 June 2004) to State Refugee Coordinators, 
National Voluntary Agencies, and Other Interested Parties, fi led 30 June 
2008, eff ective 1 August 2008.
69. Th e Patient Protection and Aff ordable Care Act, Pub L No 111–148, 124 
Stat 119 (2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub L No 111–152, 124 Stat 1029 (2010), collectively are referred 
to as the Aff ordable Care Act [ACA]; s 1411(a)(1) of the ACA (eligibility 
for the health insurance “exchanges” and the related aff ordability tax 
credits).
70. Th e Children’s Health Insurance Program was reauthorized by the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub L 
No 111-3, 123 Stat 8 at 214.
71. Offi  ce of Refugee Settlement, “Health Insurance – Beyond the First Eight 
Months”, online: An Offi  ce of Administration for Children & Families 
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/health>.
72. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, “Medicaid Benefi ts”, online: Medicaid.
gov <http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/
By-Topics/Benefi ts/Medicaid-Benefi ts.html>. 
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contrast to migrants in Canada’s fourth tier under the IFHP who now 
receive no coverage even in cases of emergency, undocumented migrants 
in the US not eligible for Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program may still access emergency medical care under the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act73 until their medical condition 
is “stabilized.”74 “[C]omprehensive primary care”75 services are also 
available to these migrants on a sliding fee through Federally Qualifi ed 
Community Health Centres and Migrant Health Centres, which are not-
for-profi t, but federally funded organizations.76 
A further signifi cant element in US coverage for migrants concerns the 
care extended to pregnant women and children regardless of immigration 
status. Under the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization 
Act,77 persons in this category enjoy coverage for “mandatory benefi ts”78 
under Medicaid but also optional benefi ts such as therapy, counseling, 
immunizations and family planning.79
Th ere is, therefore, no equivalent in US law to the third or fourth 
categories of Canada’s IFHP, which limit DCO and Rejected Refugee 
Claimants to coverage for services necessary to “diagnose, prevent or 
treat a disease posing a risk to public health or to diagnose or treat a 
condition of public safety concern”80 – or, in the case of migrants who 
have withdrawn or abandoned refugee claims or are awaiting a pre-
removal risk assessment, no coverage at all.  
B.  United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, healthcare coverage for refugees and asylum-
73. 42 USC § 1395dd (1986).
74. Ibid. 
75. Michael K Gusmano, “Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: 
U.S. Health Policy and Access to Care” (3 October 2012), online: Th e 
Hastings Centre <http://www.undocumentedpatients.org/issuebrief/
health-policy-and-access-to-care/#refmark-16>.
76. Ibid. 
77. Supra note 70.
78. Ibid. 
79. Ibid. 
80. “Summary of Benefi ts”, supra note 8.
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seekers is administered by the National Health Service (NHS).81 Th e 
NHS Constitution specifi es the “rights and responsibilities” of the NHS, 
along with its guiding principles. Among the key principles relevant here 
is one that states that “[a]ccess to NHS services is based on clinical need, 
not an individual’s ability to pay. NHS services are free of charge, except in 
limited circumstances sanctioned by Parliament.”82 Healthcare coverage 
is provided to refugees and asylum claimants awaiting determination of 
their claims, and includes both routine medical care through clinical or 
hospital visits and specialist care, along with medicine, dental, and eye 
care.83 However, the Court of Appeal for England and Wales has held 
that failed claimants are deemed not to pass the ordinary residence test 
that triggers eligibility for healthcare coverage in the UK, nor are they to 
be considered exempt from charges for care when they spend more than 
a year in the UK.84
In May of 2014, the government passed Bill 110, the Immigration 
Act 2014, which made a series of revisions to healthcare coverage for 
migrants.85 Th e government claims that changes are necessary in light 
of challenges it has faced in recovering service charges for Secondary 
Medical Care services for undocumented migrants – services that are 
off ered by medical specialists for acute healthcare conditions.86 Th e bill 
81. UK, Department of Health, Th e NHS Constitution: Th e NHS belongs 
to us all (2013), online: National Health Service <http://www.nhs.uk/
choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/NHSConstitution/Pages/Overview.
aspx>.
82. Ibid at 3.
83. “Th e National Health Service, Information Leafl et”, online: National 
Archives <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@
en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4122698.pdf>.
84. R(YA) v Secretary of State for Health, [2009] EWCA Civ 225.
85. (UK), c 22; see also Home Offi  ce, “Immigration Act 2014”, online: GOV.
UK <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-bill>.
86. UK, Home Offi  ce, Controlling Immigration – Regulating Migrant Access 
to Health Services in the UK: Consultation document, online:  GOV.UK 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/fi le/226744/consultation-health.pdf> [Controlling Immigration 
– Regulating Migrant Access]; see also UK, Home Offi  ce, Immigration 
Bill, Factsheet: Overview of the Bill, online: GOV.UK <https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/249251/
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also seeks to deter illegitimate claimants by limiting access to healthcare 
in an analogous fashion to the revised IFHP in Canada.87 Portions of the 
law yet to come into force will charge undocumented migrants, denied 
refugee claimants, and short-term visitors (defi ned as those in the UK for 
less than six months) for healthcare services.88 However, the NHS has 
indicated in its “implementation plan” that: 
[T]reatment which is considered by clinicians to be immediately necessary 
(which includes all maternity treatment), must never be withheld from 
chargeable patients, even if they have not paid in advance … 
Treatment which is not immediately necessary, but is nevertheless classed as 
urgent by clinicians, since it cannot wait until the overseas visitor can return 
home, should also be provided, even if a payment or deposit has not been 
secured. Providers are nonetheless strongly encouraged to obtain a deposit 
ahead of treatment deemed urgent if circumstances allow. However, if this 
proves unsuccessful, the treatment should not be delayed or withheld for the 
purposes of securing payment.89
Th us, by contrast to Canada, no urgent medical care or maternity treatment 
is to be withheld due to coverage issues. Th ough, as with Canada, routine 
visits to doctors or hospitals, and other forms of preventive care, are soon 
to be withdrawn from sizable numbers of migrants.
C.  Australia
As in Canada and the United Kingdom, migrants and refugee claimants 
in Australia are eligible for certain levels of healthcare coverage depending 
on their refugee status or visa category. 90 Pursuant to the Migration 
Overview_Immigration_Bill_Factsheet.pdf>.
87. Controlling Immigration – Regulating Migrant Access, ibid at 1. 
88. Ibid; UK, Home Offi  ce, Immigration Bill, Factsheet: National Health 
Service (clauses 33-34), online: GOV.UK <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/249315/
Factsheet_08_-_Health.pdf>.
89. UK, Department of Health, Visitor & Migrant NHS Cost Recovery 
Programme: Implementation Plan 2014-2016 (Crown Copyright, 2014) at 
5, online: GOV.UK <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/fi le/329789/NHS_Implentatation_Plan_
Phase_3.PDF > [emphasis in the original].
90. Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection, “Medicare”, online: Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection <http://www.immi.gov.au/Help/Pages/health/medicare.aspx> 
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Regulations 1994, 91 coverage is provided through the Humanitarian 
Program for Refugees, which is overseen by the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship.92 Th e program has two distinct sections: 
off shore resettlement (providing refugee protection for those applying 
from overseas) and onshore protections (providing refugee protection 
for those applying within Australia).93 After the application process, 
individuals who are granted a “protection visa,” “refugee visa” or “special 
humanitarian visa”94 are able to access Medicare.95 Th is includes primary 
and secondary healthcare services (i.e. referrals to specialists) that are also 
available to Australian citizens and permanent residents.96 Early health 
assessments, interventions and trauma services are also accessible to these 
individuals.97 
Asylum claimants are eligible to apply for Medicare within six 
months of their arrival in Australia. Migrants without status who have 
been in Australia longer than six months, were denied refugee status, or 
entered Australia unlawfully are not entitled to Medicare, unless certain 
exceptions apply.98 Th ese include applicants who are unaccompanied 
[“Medicare”].
91. (Cth).
92. Ibid; Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Australia’s 
Humanitarian Program (Information Paper 2014-2015), online: 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection <http://www.immi.
gov.au/media/publications/refugee/ref-hum-issues/pdf/humanitarian-
program-information-paper-14-15.pdf> [Humanitarian Program].
93. Humanitarian Program, ibid. 
94. Australian Medical Students’ Association (AMSA), “Refugees, Asylum 
Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons”, online: AMSA <http://agh.
amsa.org.au/student-centre/gh-factsheets/refugees-asylum-seekers-and-
internally-displaced-persons> [“Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally 
Displaced Persons”]; “Medicare”, supra note 90. 
95. “Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons”, ibid. 
96. Migration Regulations 1994, supra note 91.
97. Ibid; Ignacio Correa-Velez, Sandra M Giff ord & Sara J Bice, “Australian 
health policy on access to medical care for refugees and asylum seekers” 
(2005) 2:23 Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 23.
98. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Assistance for 
Asylum Seekers in Australia (Fact Sheet 62), online: Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection <http://www.immi.gov.au/media/
fact-sheets/62assistance.htm>; Correa-Velez, Giff ord & Bice, ibid.
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minors, the elderly, or families with children under 18.99 Australian law 
thus excludes coverage from certain classes of migrants, but off ers a more 
generous and humane set of exceptions.
IV.  Constitutional and Human Rights Concerns
In Canadian Doctors For Refugee Care v Canada,100 Mactavish J 
entertained a series of arguments against the constitutional validity of the 
revised 2012 IFHP and its consistency with Canada’s obligations under 
international human rights law. In what follows, we briefl y describe 
the circumstances of the individual applicants and the grounds of their 
challenge. We then focus our analysis on Mactavish J’s treatment of the 
Charter arguments and of international human rights law. Our primary 
intention here is twofold. One is to argue that while the Court declined 
to fi nd a violation of section 7, the challenge on this ground was not 
adequately addressed – with the Court overlooking facets of this case that 
distinguish it from earlier invitations to fi nd a positive duty under section 
7 in the healthcare context. Th e second point is to highlight ways in 
which the Court’s decision off ers a novel resolution to the constitutional 
claims through its analysis under sections 12 and 15.
Th e individual Applicants in the case are two individuals, Daniel 
Garcia Rodriquez and Hanif Ayubi.101 Rodriquez is a failed refugee 
claimant, though his spouse – who was a successful claimant – had been 
in the process of sponsoring him for permanent residence at the time the 
application was fi led. As a failed claimant, Rodriquez was placed in the 
third tier of IFHP care, depriving him of coverage for an urgent operation 
in August of 2012 to repair a detached retina.102 Prior to the July changes, 
the operation would have been covered. His doctor wrote the Ministry 
99. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Bridging E Visas 
for Illegal Maritime Arrivals (Fact Sheet 65), online: Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection <http://www.immi.gov.au/About/
Pages/media/fact-sheet-65.aspx>.
100. Supra note 17.
101. Along with Rodriquez and Ayubi, the application was brought by two 
advocacy groups: the Canadian Association for Refugee Lawyers and 
Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care. See ibid.
102. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 20.
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of Immigration seeking discretionary coverage on the basis that further 
delay would risk blindness, but the Ministry declined on the grounds 
that Rodriquez was in Canada illegally.103 Doctors performed the surgery 
on August 20th to avoid further risk, recovering only a fraction of the 
cost.104
Ayubi, the other Applicant, came to Canada from Afghanistan in 
2001, made an unsuccessful claim for refugee status, but remained in 
Canada due to a moratorium on removals to Afghanistan. As a type 1 
diabetic, he had been receiving insulin and medical care prior to 2012, 
but lost coverage for medicine under the revised scheme and could not 
aff ord either the necessary insulin or the blood tests to monitor his 
condition. He sought and was eventually granted discretionary IFHP 
coverage for medical services but not for medication. As the Applicants’ 
memoranda of argument noted, “he is being kept alive on free samples of 
insulin obtained by a community health centre due to the charity of the 
drug manufacturer.”105 Th e government argued that the IFHP is entirely 
discretionary or ex gratia and not grounded in any statutory obligation, 
rendering the decision of whether to continue funding it – and to what 
degree – purely a matter of policy. 106 For the Applicants, the program 
may have begun as an ex gratia program, but over the passage of time, it 
ceased to be one by virtue of the embrace of a national publically funded 
healthcare system for citizens, residents, and in some cases foreigners – 
together with treaty obligations under international human rights law 
that prohibit discriminatory treatment of refugees among other non-
103. Ibid. 
104. Ibid; Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 50 (the 
Respondents concede that Rodriquez was eligible for only “public health 
and public safety” coverage beginning in August of 2012, but note that he 
became eligible for Ontario’s Health Insurance Plan in November of that 
year).
105. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 22 (the memorandum 
also indicates that Ayubi requires other medication that he is not receiving 
and that the insulin he does receive gratuitously does not always match his 
prescription).
106. Backgrounder to the Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, 
2012, supra note 4 (appended to the Order), cited in Applicants’ 
Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 36; Respondents’ Memorandum, 
supra note 8 at para 70.
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citizens.107 Th e Applicants also argued that the 2012 revisions to the 
IFHP were ultra vires because the prerogative of the federal executive in 
the fi elds of immigration and healthcare had been extinguished due to 
the passage of the Canada Health Act (CHA)108 and the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).109 As the Ontario Court of Appeal held, 
“once a statute occupies ground formally occupied by the prerogative, 
the prerogative goes into abeyance. Th e Crown may no longer act 
under the prerogative, but must act under and subject to the conditions 
imposed by the statute.”110 In this case, the Applicants contended, the 
passage of IRPA and the CHA extinguished any remaining prerogative 
over refugee healthcare “expressly or by necessary implication.”111 Th e 
government’s response to this second claim was that neither statute at 
issue deals in particular with healthcare for immigrants and refugees, and 
therefore Crown prerogative in this area may only be extinguished by 
explicit legislative directive or by necessary implication of the words in 
the statute.112 
Justice Mactavish took issue with both parties’ positions. Th e IFHP 
was neither entirely ex gratia, nor had the prerogative been extinguished.113 
Since it was created, it had given rise to obligations to pay healthcare 
providers who had agreed to provide coverage under the plan. And due 
to the lack of federal legislation addressing the question of healthcare to 
refugees, claimants, or failed claimants, “the Crown’s prerogative power 
107. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 36 (see the discussion 
below of Article 7 of the Refugee Convention of 1951, and other 
obligations under international law).
108. RSC, 1985, c C-6 [CHA].
109. Supra note 6; Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 38.
110. Black v Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 199 DLR (4th) 228, cited in 
Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 44.
111. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 45.
112. In support of this latter proposition, the Respondents cite section 17 of 
the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21: “[n]o enactment is binding on 
Her Majesty or aff ects Her Majesty or Her Majesty’s rights or prerogatives 
in any manner, except as mentioned or referred to in the enactment.” 
Th ey also cite Khadr v Canada (AG), 2006 FC 727 (in which Phelan J 
surveyed Canadian and English authority on the point, concluding that 
Crown prerogative “can only be abolished or exhausted by clear words in a 
statute or by necessary implication from words in a statute” at para 91).
113. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at paras 394-402.
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to spend in an area not addressed by statute remains intact,” rendering 
the 2012 orders in council intra vires.114 However, this did not relieve the 
government from judicial scrutiny over modifi cations to the program, 
including Charter conformity.115 Although Mactavish J dispensed with 
the Applicants’ section 7 claim, she found violations of sections 12 and 
15 of the Charter, and held that they were not reasonable under section 
1. We consider each section in turn.
A.  Section 7
Section 7 guarantees everyone in Canada “the right to life, liberty, and 
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principals of fundamental justice.”116 Th e Applicants 
in Canadian Doctors had argued that changes to the IFHP had deprived 
them of rights to life and security of the person, and that they had done 
so in a manner that was contrary to the principles of fundamental justice 
for being arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the government’s 
stated intentions.117 Th e rights were violated because the withdrawal of 
coverage had rendered aff ected migrants unable to pay for critical care, 
placing them at risk of serious illness or death, and subjecting them 
to “severe psychological distress.”118 Justice Mactavish agreed with the 
Respondents’ submission that the Applicants’ claim was tantamount to 
asserting a positive obligation on the part of the government to provide 
healthcare funding (or some essential social benefi t) under section 7 – a 
claim that several courts have thus far resisted. Relying primarily on a 
series of decisions that include Flora119 and Toussaint,120 which dismissed 
attempts to assert a positive right to healthcare under section 7, Mactavish 
J conceded that rights to life and security of the person may be engaged 
by the facts before the Court, but suggested that the weight of authority 
prevents the Court in this case from making the fi nding that those rights 
114. Ibid at para 401.
115. Ibid at para 402.
116. Charter, supra note 14.
117. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at paras 86-97.
118. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 499.
119. Flora, supra note 15.
120. Toussaint Appeal, supra note 56.
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have been deprived.121
 Yet Mactavish J’s decision on the issue of section 7 fails to address 
a broader argument that the Applicants sought to advance in this case 
– an argument that may be best addressed at the appellate level, and 
perhaps at the Supreme Court of Canada in particular. Th e argument 
was that the facts in this case present a unique set of circumstances that 
may constitute the closest approximation to what the Supreme Court 
contemplated in Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General)122 when it fi rst 
articulated the possibility that section 7 may, in “special circumstances,” 
give rise to a positive duty on the part of the state. While Mactavish 
J distinguished the facts at bar from those in earlier Supreme Court 
decisions including Chaoulli 123 and PHS Community, 124 she discerned 
no substantive diff erence between the present case and a series of other 
cases in which litigants sought the recognition of a duty to provide an 
essential benefi t under section 7.125 To make clear how this case can be 
distinguished from the facts in those earlier decisions, and why it may 
meet the Gosselin test in ways that earlier cases have failed to, we begin by 
briefl y revisiting the Supreme Court’s considerations in Gosselin.
In decisions preceding Gosselin, without holding so explicitly, the 
Supreme Court had contemplated the possibility that section 7 might 
protect “economic rights fundamental to human life or survival.”126 Dicta 
in other cases had also expressed a reluctance on the part of individual 
members of the court to read section 7 too restrictively; for example, in 
Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration,127 Justice Wilson cited 
a Law Reform Commission of Canada paper for the assertion that “the 
right to security of the person means not only protection of one’s physical 
integrity, but the provision of necessaries for its support.” 128 Gosselin 
121. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 497.
122. Supra note 16. 
123. Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35 [Chaoulli].
124. Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 
44 [PHS Community or Insite].
125. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at paras 547-58.
126. Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 1003.
127. [1985] 1 SCR 177.
128. Ibid at 207. For other examples, see the discussion in Martha Jackman, 
Th e Implications of Section 7 of the Charter for Health Care Spending in 
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involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a diff erential funding 
scheme under Quebec’s social assistance legislation, giving rise to the 
issue of whether section 7 guaranteed a minimal level of social assistance 
to safeguard the right to life or security of the person by providing for 
basic needs. In declining to recognize this claim on the facts before the 
Court, McLachlin CJC, writing for the majority, explicitly affi  rmed the 
broader possibility that section 7 could form the basis for a positive state 
duty to protect rights to life and security of the person. 
As the Chief Justice noted, much of the prior jurisprudence had 
suggested that section 7 was only meant to guard against a deprivation of 
life, liberty, or security of the person that occurs as a result of a person’s 
“interaction with the justice system and its administration.”129 But in 
McLachlin CJC’s view, section 7 need not be applied in such narrow terms: 
“[a]n adjudicative context might be suffi  cient” to implicate section 7, she 
stated, but the Court had “not yet determined that one is necessary.”130 
Even if section 7 does apply to cases where the administration of justice is 
not implicated, it would remain to be decided whether section 7 should 
protect economic rights essential for survival. Put otherwise, the Court 
would have to decide whether section 7 places a positive obligation on 
the state to “ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or security of the 
person.”131 
Th e Chief Justice affi  rmed that it might, asserting that “[o]ne day s. 
7 may be interpreted to include positive obligations.”132 Invoking Lord 
Sankey’s dicta in Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada,133 she held that 
“the Canadian Charter must be viewed as ‘a living tree capable of growth 
and expansion within its natural limits’.”134 Th e Chief Justice provided a 
fi rst step in this direction by setting out a framework for assessing a claim 
for a breach of section 7 based on a positive state obligation to provide for 
Canada (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 
2002) at 5 [Jackman, Th e Implications of Section 7].
129. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J), 
[1999] 3 SCR 46 at para 65, cited in Gosselin, supra note 16 at para 77.
130. Gosselin, ibid at para 78.
131. Ibid at para 79.
132. Ibid at para 82.
133. [1930] AC 124 [Edwards].
134. Gosselin, supra note 16 at para 82, citing Edwards, ibid at 136.
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some essential benefi t. An applicant must demonstrate:
(1) that the legislation aff ects an interest protected by the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person within the meaning of s. 7; (2) that providing 
inadequate benefi ts constitutes a “deprivation” by the state; and (3) that, if 
deprivation of a right protected by s. 7 is established, this was not in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice.135
Despite a powerful dissent by Arbour J, who was disposed to move in 
this direction in Gosselin itself (with L’Heureux-Dube J concurring), 
McLachlin CJC held that the facts in that case were not suffi  cient to 
meet the test she set out, but wrote:
I leave open the possibility that a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty, or 
security of the person may be made out in special circumstances. However, this 
is not such a case. Th e impugned program contained compensatory ‘workfare’ 
provisions and the evidence of actual hardship is wanting. Th e frail platform 
provided by the facts of this case cannot support the weight of a positive state 
obligation of citizen support.136
Th e majority in Gosselin thus affi  rmed the possibility that the provision 
of inadequate benefi ts could constitute a deprivation under section 7 – 
and on this basis, section 7 could compel the state to provide an essential 
benefi t.137 But it would require “special circumstances” and “evidence 
135. Ibid at para 75.
136. Ibid at para 83 [emphasis added].
137. In her dissenting opinion, Arbour J held that “every suitable approach 
to Charter interpretation, including textual analysis, purposive analysis, 
and contextual analysis, mandates the conclusion that the section 7 rights 
of life, liberty and security of the person include a positive dimension” 
at para 357. She thus read section 7 to include two distinct parts: “a 
free-standing right to life, liberty and security of the person” (at para 
386) and a right not to be deprived of those rights except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice. She also held, however, that 
where the state fails to fulfi ll its positive obligation to provide for life, 
liberty, or security of the person by inaction – rather than by a law or 
action that “curtails” one of these rights – it is not necessary to engage in 
an analysis of whether the state’s inaction was contrary to fundamental 
justice, but only to assess whether the violation could be justifi ed under 
section 1. In this case, she found that “a minimum level of welfare is so 
closely connected to issues relating to one’s basic health (or security of 
the person), and potentially even to one’s survival (or life interest), that 
it appears inevitable that a positive right to life, liberty and security of 
the person must provide for it” at para 358. Th e violation could not be 
justifi ed under section 1.
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of actual hardship” compelling enough to support the obligation. Th e 
groundwork was therefore laid for the fi nding of a positive state duty 
under section 7, but signifi cantly, what McLachlin CJC had in mind 
by the phrase “special circumstances” remained unclear. Gosselin invited 
future courts to entertain constitutional challenges to deprivations of 
coverage for essential services, but off ered no guidance as to when the 
test of “special circumstances” is made out.
Despite this ambiguity at the core of Gosselin, later courts have moved 
slowly in the direction of fulfi lling its promise. A number of cases have 
held that (a) state involvement that hinders access to healthcare engages 
section 7, (b) the hindrance amounts to a deprivation, and in some cases, 
(c) the deprivation is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. 
However, in no case after Gosselin has a court held that a state refusal to 
fund a benefi t constituted a deprivation under section 7 in a manner that 
is contrary to fundamental justice.138 Yet, the case law suggests that this 
may be a small step from points reached thus far. Th e diff erences between 
the facts in those cases and the present case are important for assessing 
why this case might meet the Gosselin test.
For three members of the Supreme Court in Chaoulli v Quebec 
(Attorney General)139 (including McLachlin CJC), the prohibition in 
Quebec’s Hospital Insurance Act140 on access to private insurance for 
treating life-threatening illnesses had engaged section 7. Evidence had 
clearly demonstrated that long wait-times in the public system for 
critical treatment had placed the applicant’s life or security of the person 
in jeopardy.141 Finally, the deprivation was contrary to the principles of 
fundamental justice for being arbitrary. On the evidence, the prohibition 
on private insurance was not necessary for advancing the legislation’s 
primary objective of maintaining the quality of the publically funded 
138. One exception to this is the trial decision in Toussaint, supra note 18 
(explored in more detail below), in which the exclusion of coverage from 
the IFHP of a non-status migrant (i.e. a refusal to fund her) amounted 
to a deprivation under section 7; but the deprivation was held to be not 
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.
139. Supra note 123.
140. CQLR c A-28.
141. Supra note 123 at paras 119, 123.
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healthcare system. Notably, however, Chaoulli involved a law that served 
as a barrier to accessing private care. Th e present case, by contrast, turns 
on the validity of a refusal to continue providing a benefi t.142 
In some respects, the Supreme Court’s decision in PHS Community, 
involving the government’s decision to close a safe-injection site for 
heroine addicts in Vancouver, off ers a closer analogy to the facts in the 
present case.143 Among the issues in that case was the validity under section 
7 of a ministerial exercise of discretion under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act144 to exempt healthcare workers and users of the site from 
the law’s criminal prohibition on the possession of controlled substances. 
Th e Applicants had argued that the federal Minister of Health’s refusal to 
renew an existing exemption amounted to a violation of section 7, given 
the likely impact of the refusal on the medical condition of the program’s 
clientele. Th e evidence had established that the program clearly had 
much success in saving lives and avoiding further harm to a vulnerable 
population. Th e refusal had engaged clients’ rights under section 7 given 
that without the exemption, the CDSA’s prohibition on possession 
hindered access to a form of assistance by healthcare professionals that 
reduced the risk of death or serious illness for those suff ering from a drug 
addiction.145 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice McLachlin invoked 
Morgentaler, 146 Rodriguez, 147 and Chaoulli148 in affi  rming the proposition 
142. Th e minority’s approach to the constitutional protection of access to 
health care in primarily negative terms (a right not to be hindered from 
accessing care rather than a right to be provided a minimal level of care) 
has been the subject of extensive critical commentary. See e.g. Colleen M 
Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds, Access to Care: Access to Justice 
– Th e Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005); Jeff  A King, “Constitutional Rights 
and Social Welfare: A Comment on the Canadian Chaoulli Health Care 
Decision” (2006) 69:4 Mod L Rev 631; Martha Jackman, “‘Th e Last Line 
of Defence for [Which?] Citizens’: Accountability, Equality and the Right 
to Health in Chaoulli” (2006) 44:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 349.
143. Supra note 124.
144. SC 1996, c 19 [CDSA].
145. Supra note 124 at para 93.
146. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 [Morgentaler].
147. Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519 
[Rodriguez].
148. Supra note 123.
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that “[w]here a law creates a risk to health by preventing access to health 
care, a deprivation of the right to security of the person is made out 
… Where the law creates a risk not just to the health but also to the 
lives of the claimants, the deprivation is even clearer.”149 Th e refusal to 
renew the exemption amounted to a deprivation, and one that was not in 
accordance with fundamental justice on the grounds that it was arbitrary, 
grossly disproportionate, and overbroad. It was arbitrary in part given the 
evidence that the site had saved lives and not increased crime, and the 
decision to refuse the exemption bore no relation to the CDSA’s objective 
of maintaining public health and safety. 
As with the Insite case, the present challenge to the 2012 IFHP 
involves a decision to remove a benefi t that results in adverse health 
consequences for those aff ected. A key diff erence is that in the Insite case, 
the Minster of Health decided to exempt the operation of a law (drug 
possession) rather than to fund a benefi t (for example, the site itself ). 
Th e question here is whether the refusal to fund refugee healthcare can 
be said to constitute a deprivation of life or security of the person on the 
basis that removing coverage is tantamount to depriving aff ected persons 
of access to care.  
Th e Applicants argue that denying coverage amounts to “erecting 
a barrier to essential health services” since many if not most refugee 
claimants come to Canada in exigent circumstances, cannot aff ord to pay 
for care, and philanthropic funding may not be available consistently.150 
Denying coverage also entails a “deprivation” of security of the person 
comparable to the facts in Chaoulli, on the basis that at least one applicant 
is suff ering from a potentially life-threatening illness (diabetes).151 On 
this reading, the fi rst two stages in the Gosselin test would be made out.
Th e government, by contrast, argues that section 7 is not engaged 
because “it does not cause a deprivation of medical care, nor prevent 
or prohibit access to it.”152 Refugee claimants, failed claimants, and 
those ineligible for IFHP coverage can obtain care through other means 
149. PHS Community, supra note 124 at para 93.
150. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 75.
151. Ibid.
152. Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 8 at para 101.
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described above (community health centres, philanthropic programs, or 
emergency services at hospitals). On this view, migrants are deprived of 
healthcare only if clearly hindered by law or if removal of coverage has 
the eff ect of hindering access to any necessary care. Th e state has not 
deprived migrants of care because they still have some means of access. 
Th e Applicants’ claim is, in the government’s view, primarily economic. 
And, as the government contended, a wide range of authority holds that 
despite the possibility left open in Gosselin, courts have not recognized 
that section 7 imposes a positive obligation to provide a benefi t necessary 
to protect life or security of the person – and have been especially reluctant 
to apply section 7 “when the benefi t involves an economic component.”153 
Curiously, however, in Canadian Doctors, Mactavish J rejected the 
proposition that because migrants still had access to other avenues of care 
– community health centres, charity, emergency services – they were not 
deprived of care.154 She also found that these other avenues are inadequate 
for a host of reasons, leaving at least some indigent migrants at risk of 
serious illness and in many cases “tremendous psychological strain.”155 
But she was reluctant to fi nd that this deprivation of care endangering 
life and security of the person was therefore a possible deprivation of life 
and security of the person under section 7. 
Th e Court in Canadian Doctors would have been justifi ed in taking 
this further step on the basis that none of the authorities on which 
the government relies contemplate the guarantee of a minimal level 
of healthcare for a group analogous to refugees who come to Canada 
under exigent circumstances. Th e government’s authorities for limiting 
section 7 to a negative duty can be distinguished into three categories 
of cases with each entailing a clearly diff erent kind of claim from that in 
the present case. One consists of cases in which claimants have sought 
recognition of a social or economic right to social assistance or housing, 
with courts refusing to recognize a positive duty to provide a minimal 
level of social assistance.156 A key factor here is that a minimal level of 
153. Ibid at paras 102-03, citing Masse, Flora, CCW, Sagarian, Wynberg, Grant, 
and Tanudjaja, supra note 15; Toussaint, supra note 18.
154. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at paras 261-86.
155. Ibid at paras 285, 295-99.
156. See e.g. Masse, Grant, and Tanudjaja, supra note 15.
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assistance is already available throughout Canada. In deciding not to 
recognize a section 7 claim in this context, courts are essentially resisting 
the invitation to set a minimal amount of assistance, given that a certain 
level of assistance is, for the foreseeable future, something close to a social 
and political certainty.
A second group contemplates coverage for prescriptions or treatment 
for autism and analogous conditions – matters impinging on security 
of the person but not life-threatening.157 Finally, three cases that have 
the closest application (and are cited in Canadian Doctors) are ones in 
which applicants suff ering life-threatening illnesses brought section 7 
challenges to compel state funding.158 However, the claimants in each of 
these cases are in distinctly diff erent positions from those directly aff ected 
by changes to the IFHP. And the applicants in two of the cases were 
asking courts to recognize fi nancial obligations on the part of the state of 
a diff erent nature.
Th e fi rst of these cases, Toussaint v Attorney General of Canada,159 is 
signifi cant because it involved a challenge under section 7 to the validity 
of the IFHP’s exclusion from coverage (prior to 2012) of a foreign 
national who suff ered a life-threatening illness. In contrast to the present 
case, Ms. Toussaint was a citizen of Grenada who visited Canada in 1999 
and chose to outstay her visa, remaining illegally. From 1999 to 2006, she 
worked and could aff ord health care. At that point her health declined 
severely, preventing her from working and requiring greater care than 
she could aff ord. She received various treatments in hospital in 2007 and 
2008, as her condition worsened, and she was unable to pay the bills she 
was incurring. In 2009, her condition, which included diabetes, a kidney 
disorder, and renal dysfunction, became life-threatening; yet she was able 
to obtain only emergency care and limited medication.160 Justice Zinn 
157. See e.g. Auton (a decision primarily concerning section 15, though a 
violation of section 7 was alleged and dismissed), Wynberg, and Sagharian, 
supra note 15.
158. Flora and CCW, supra note 15; Toussaint, supra note 18. 
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid at para 91. On the urgency of the Applicant’s condition, Zinn J cited 
affi  davit evidence of a doctor for the fi nding that “[i]f she were to not 
receive timely and appropriate health care and medications in the future, 
she would be at very high risk of immediate death (due to recurrent blood 
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found that in light of the applicant’s condition, the IFHP’s exclusion 
of coverage to non-status aliens deprived her of the right to security of 
the person under section 7. But his Lordship refused to accept that the 
deprivation was contrary to fundamental justice. 
Th e Federal Court of Appeal affi  rmed the decision but upheld 
the holding that the Appellant’s exclusion from coverage amounted 
to a deprivation under section 7.161 On the question of whether the 
deprivation was in accordance with fundamental justice, the Court went 
a step further than Zinn J by suggesting that the operative cause of the 
deprivation was not the IFHP’s exclusion, but rather, the limitation 
in Ontario’s health insurance plan to non-status aliens, together with 
the Appellant’s voluntary choice to remain in Canada without legal 
status.162 As Stratas JA asserted, the “provision of public health coverage 
and the regulation of access to it is primarily the responsibility of the 
provinces and the territories, with the federal government playing a 
role in funding, the setting of standards under the Canada Health Act 
… and, occasionally, regulation in specifi c areas under its criminal law 
power.”163 If a deprivation under section 7 occurred here, it was because 
the provincial plan did not extend “far enough to cover all of her medical 
needs.”164 Th e Court also affi  rmed the lower court’s fi nding that the 
IFHP’s exclusion was not arbitrary, citing Zinn J’s dicta from the decision 
below that there is:
… nothing arbitrary in denying fi nancial coverage for health care to persons 
who have chosen to enter and remain in Canada illegally. To grant such coverage 
to those persons would make  Canada  a health-care safe-haven for all who 
require health care and health care services. Th ere is nothing fundamentally 
clots and pulmonary embolism), severe medium-term complications (such 
as kidney failure and subsequent requirement for dialysis), and other long-
term complications of poorly-controlled diabetes and hypertension (such 
as blindness, foot ulcers, leg amputation, heart attack, and stroke).”
161. Toussaint Appeal, supra note 56 at para 61.
162. Ibid at para 72. On the requirement that the claimant establish that an 
impugned law is the operative cause of a deprivation under section 7, the 
Court cited TrueHope Nutritional Support Limited v Canada (AG), 2011 
FCA 114 at para 11.
163. Toussaint Appeal, supra note 56 at para 72.
164. Ibid at para 70.
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unjust in refusing to create such a situation.165
In distinction to Toussaint, however, the present case does not involve 
applicants who came to Canada in a fully voluntary sense or chose 
to remain without status. A more complex question is whether limits 
in provincial and territorial coverage are also the operative cause of a 
deprivation on the part of refugees covered under the pre-2012 IFHP.
On one reading, they are. As in Toussaint, any deprivation under 
section 7 that claimants in this case suff er is due primarily to the failure of 
provincial and territorial plans to make up the shortfall in coverage – on 
the assumption that provinces and territories bear primary responsibility 
for regulating access to and coverage of health care for refugees. But Stratas 
JA may have oversimplifi ed the question of federal jurisdiction over health 
care, and of jurisdiction over refugee health in particular. Under section 
95 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 166 immigration is a matter of concurrent 
jurisdiction, with the federal government having paramount authority in 
the event of a confl ict.167 Section 91(25) provides the federal government 
exclusive jurisdiction over “naturalization and aliens.”168 However, in 
Schneider v Th e Queen,169 the Supreme Court held that:
‘[H]ealth’ is not a matter which is subject to specifi c constitutional assignment 
but instead is an amorphous topic which can be addressed by valid federal 
or provincial legislation, depending on the circumstances of each case on the 
nature or scope of the health problem in question. 170
Sections 91(11) and 92(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867171 address the 
operation of quarantine and hospitals, but the Constitution is otherwise 
silent on the subject of healthcare. Provincial responsibility for the 
165. Ibid at para 69; Stratas JA noted at para 71 that the “record reveals no 
attempt by the appellant to assert section 7 or 15 of the Charter against 
provincial legislation that limits her access to health care.”
166. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
167. Nancy Miller Chenier, Federal Responsibility for the Health Care of Specifi c 
Groups (Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 2004)
at 11.
168. Ibid.
169. [1982] 2 SCR 112.
170. Ibid at 142. See also Martha Jackman, “Constitutional Jurisdiction Over 
Health in Canada” (2000) 8 Health LJ 95 [Jackman, “Constitutional 
Jurisdiction Over Health”]. 
171. Supra note 166.
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delivery of most health services is understood to derive from powers over 
property and civil rights in section 92(13) and matters of a merely local 
or private nature in section 92(16). 172 Th e federal government’s spending 
power over healthcare and criminal law power in matters impinging 
upon health are also well established. 173 A further potential source that 
may apply to refugee health is found at the outset of section 91, which 
provides Parliament the power to “make laws for the peace, order and 
good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within 
the classes of subject by this Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures 
of the provinces.”174 Th e Supreme Court has held that the POGG power 
is available where a matter not addressed elsewhere in the division of 
powers is a matter of national concern, is “singular” or “indivisible” 
in nature, and is not amenable to being addressed in a more effi  cient 
manner by the provinces individually.175 If refugee health care falls within 
the purview of the federal government, then by contrast to Stratas JA’s 
holding in Toussaint, changes to the IFHP would serve as a more direct 
and thus operative cause of a deprivation of security of the person for the 
individual applicants in this case.
In the second case, Flora v Ontario Health Insurance Plan,176 the 
appellant was diagnosed with liver cancer but found ineligible for a 
liver transplant in Ontario under a set of criteria commonly applied by 
doctors throughout the province, given the size and number of tumors 
in his liver. He then sought and obtained a transplant in England where 
the criteria for such a procedure were more generous. Th e transplant 
saved his life, but cost $450,000. He applied under the Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan (OHIP) for reimbursement and was declined. Th e Health 
172. Martha Butler & Marlisa Tiedemann, Th e Federal Role in Health and 
Health Care (Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 
2011) at 1.
173. Ibid at 2-3. See also Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 
3 SCR 624 at para 15 [Eldridge]; Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan 
(BC), [1991] 2 SCR 525 at 567; Jackman, “Constitutional Jurisdiction 
Over Health”, supra note 170 at 97.
174. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 166.
175. R v Crown Zellerbach, [1988] 1 SCR 401 at 431-32; Butler & Tiedemann, 
supra note 172 at 4. 
176. Supra note 15.
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Services Appeal and Review Board upheld the decision on the basis that 
the treatment did not meet the criteria for “insured service” under section 
28.4(2) of Regulation 552 of the Health Insurance Act,177 because the 
transplant was not “generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a 
person in the same medical circumstances.”178 Th e Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice dismissed an appeal of this decision, and the dismissal 
was upheld by the Court of Appeal.179
Before the latter Court, Flora had noted that an earlier version of the 
regulation had allowed funding for his treatment on the basis of “medical 
necessity” rather than what was “generally accepted” as “appropriate.” 
Flora argued that the amended law allowing for discretionary coverage 
violated section 7 because denying him coverage deprived him of 
access to life-saving treatment. He also argued more generally that 
“s. 7 imposes a positive obligation on the state to provide life-saving 
medical treatments, thus obviating the need for a fi nding of state action 
amounting to deprivation.”180 Justice Cronk, on behalf of a unanimous 
Court of Appeal, held that Flora had “failed to demonstrate that the 
Regulation constituted a deprivation by the state of his rights to life or 
security of the person.”181
Th e Court arrived at this conclusion by distinguishing the facts from 
those in Chaoulli,182 Morgentaler,183 and Rodriguez.184 In each of those 
cases, the impugned provision placed the appellant in a situation in 
which his or her life or security of the person was aff ected or threatened: 
in Morgentaler, the mandatory therapeutic abortion committee system 
had this eff ect; in Rodriguez, the criminal prohibition on assisted 
suicide did so; and in Chaoulli, the prohibition on private healthcare 
forced people in critical condition onto waitlists.185 By contrast, the 
regulation in Flora “does not prohibit or impede anyone from seeking 
177. Regulation 552, supra note 58.
178. Ibid, s 28.4(2).
179. Flora, supra note 15.
180. Ibid at para 93.
181. Ibid at para 95.
182. Supra note 123.
183. Supra note 146.
184. Supra note 147.
185. Flora, supra note 15 at paras 98-100.
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medical treatment” or limit the kind of treatment available.186 It provides 
for coverage of some out-of-country treatments, but does not violate 
section 7 for its failure to cover all of them. On the question of a broader 
positive duty under section 7, Cronk JA cited McLachlin CJC’s dicta in 
Gosselin, and conceded that “s. 7 may one day be interpreted to include 
positive obligations in special circumstances where, at a minimum, the 
evidentiary record discloses actual hardship.”187 But to this point, he 
noted, “the protection aff orded by s. 7… has not been extended to cases 
– like this one – involving solely economic rights.”188 Th us, in this case, 
absent evidence of “actual hardship,” or a loss of coverage that actually 
threatens a person’s life or security of the person, the claim was perceived 
to be “solely economic.” In distinction to this case, however, refugees 
or rejected claimants denied coverage under the IFHP do face actual 
hardship given the special circumstances that bring them to Canada 
(duress, endangerment, and persecution), their inability to pay, and a 
critical medical condition.
A third relevant case is CCW v Ontario Health Insurance Plan,189 
in which the three appellants had been denied coverage for out-of-
country treatment due to a failure to obtain prior approval from the 
General Manager of the Ontario Hospital Insurance Plan. Th e appellants 
argued, inter alia, that the requirement of prior approval amounted to a 
deprivation of the right to life or security of the person under section 7. 
Th ey also sought to draw an analogy between the requirement for prior 
approval and the prohibition on private health insurance in Chaoulli. 
Both required patients to wait for treatment in the public system, joining 
lengthy queues that created life-threatening conditions. At least one 
appellant in CCW risked serious injury or death if he did not leave Canada 
to seek treatment immediately, and could not obtain prior approval for 
coverage given his lack of timely access to his doctor.
Justice Swinton dispensed with the section 7 claim by citing Flora for 
the proposition that there is no deprivation under section 7 because of 
186. Ibid at para 101.
187. Ibid at para 105.
188. Ibid at para 106.
189. Supra note 15.
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the province’s decision to limit funding in ways that do not hinder access 
or limit forms of treatment to which one has access. Nor does the law, at 
present, impose a positive obligation on the state to provide a “fi nancial 
benefi t that is not otherwise required by law”190 – or, as Cronk JA held in 
Flora, not in the absence of evidence of “actual hardship.”191 Th is case was 
also unlike Morgentaler or Chaoulli where the legislative regime at issue 
prevented a person from obtaining necessary treatment. Here, as Swinton 
J noted, there was “no evidence that the appellants suff ered a delay in 
obtaining necessary medical services because of the legislation.”192
As with Flora, CCW can be distinguished from the present case by 
an absence of “actual hardship” that can be tied directly to the legislative 
provision. Th e denial of coverage in this case results in a fi nancial 
hardship. But for the Applicants challenging the IFHP regime, the denial 
of coverage is a direct cause of the threat to life or security of the person. It 
serves as a direct cause in a way that has no direct analogy in these or any 
of the other cases on which the government seeks to rely. In distinction 
to the “minimal level of basic service” cases, the Applicants might have 
access to no alternate coverage – aside from emergency coverage at 
hospitals. Th is would mean that a person’s right to life is not infringed 
under section 7, but the limitation of coverage to this level still leaves 
the question of whether a person is deprived of security of the person 
for suff ering a serious or life-threatening illness and having to wait for a 
visit to the emergency ward to receive treatment. Moreover, unlike Flora, 
CCW, and other OHIP cases in which section 7 has been invoked, in the 
case of refugee claimants the issue is not strictly monetary. Th eir situation 
cannot be reduced to a strict inability to pay. It is an inability that fl ows 
from a position as a refugee or a person in need of protection. Th ese may 
constitute the “special circumstances” contemplated in Gosselin by virtue 
of meeting the standard of “actual hardship” articulated in that case. 
B.  Principles of Fundamental Justice
If revisions to the IFHP result in a deprivation of life or security of the 
190. Ibid at paras 98-100.
191. Supra note 15 at para 105.
192. CCW, supra note 15 at para 101.
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person under section 7, the application must also meet the third part of 
the test in Gosselin: establishing that rights were deprived in a manner 
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. Two principles on which 
the appellant seeks to rely are arbitrariness and gross disproportionality.
Writing for a minority in Chaoulli,193 McLachlin CJC and Major J 
off ered a defi nition of arbitrariness in the context of section 7 that has 
been cited approvingly by the Court in later decisions:
In order not to be arbitrary, the limit on life, liberty and security requires 
not only a theoretical connection between the limit and the legislative goal, 
but a real connection on the facts …  Th e question in every case is whether 
the measure is arbitrary in the sense of bearing no real relation to the goal 
and hence being manifestly unfair.  Th e more serious the impingement on the 
person’s liberty and security, the more clear must be the connection.  Where 
the individual’s very life may be at stake, the reasonable person would expect 
a clear connection, in theory and in fact, between the measure that puts life at 
risk and the legislative goals.194
Chief Justice McLachlin defi ned gross-disproportionality in the Insite 
decision in terms of “state actions or legislative responses to a problem 
that are so extreme as to be disproportionate to any legitimate government 
interest.”195 
Th e Applicants in the IFHP challenge contend that the 2012 changes 
were both arbitrary and grossly disproportionate in light of the objectives 
of the new plan set out in a press release issued at the time the changes 
were announced.196 One objective was “fairness to Canadians,” or to put 
in place a scheme that provided no greater benefi ts to refugee claimants 
than those available to most Canadians. It was assumed to be superior 
in the sense of providing limited dental and eye care benefi ts, which are 
not commonly included in provincial and territorial plans for citizens 
and residents. However, the same coverage is extended to those on 
social assistance in most provinces and to those el igible under Quebec’s 
provincial plan – and this group is a more appropriate comparator to 
193. Supra note 123.
194. Ibid at para 131, cited in AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family 
Services), 2009 SCC 30, and PHS Community, supra note 124.
195. Ibid at para 133.
196. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 88.
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refugees.197 And thus, if it is not correct to assume that the earlier IFHP 
off ered superior coverage to what is available to other Canadians, the 
Applicants argue that it is arbitrary to deprive persons of a right to life 
or security of the person on this ground. Th ey also argue that denying 
coverage is arbitrary because the new plan does not equalize coverage in 
the name of fairness but removes it altogether (for certain classes of non-
citizen).198 Th ese arguments are consistent with Mactavish J’s analysis of 
the government’s objectives under section 1 (explored further below), 
in which she dismissed the notion that the pre-2012 IFHP entailed an 
unfairness in coverage between migrants and working Canadians.199
A second objective of the revised IFHP was to remove an incentive 
for foreigners who may come to Canada in bad faith or who intend to 
remain in Canada after a failed refugee claim. Yet, as the Applicants 
note, the government has off ered no support for the proposition that 
withdrawing coverage from certain groups would deter fraudulent 
claims.200 In her section 1 analysis, Mactavish J agreed with this, asserting 
that the “deterrence argument is founded to a large extent on a subjective 
perception held by unidentifi ed individuals.”201 It is also grossly 
disproportionate in the sense that by changing the plan and withholding 
health care coverage from one refugee claimant so as to deter another 
amounts to “a particularly egregious instance of treating a human being 
instrumentally as merely a means to an end.”202 
A further objective was cost savings, but the Applicants argue that 
the cost implications of the program render the changes to the IFHP 
both arbitrary and grossly disproportionate in relation to this stated goal. 
Th e Applicants tendered affi  davit evidence from various stakeholders in 
support of the claim that “hospitals, clinics and even health practitioners 
have largely been forced to absorb the cost of treating refugees where 
the patients could not pay or fundraising came up short.”203 Th e 
197. Ibid at para 159.
198. Ibid at para 91.
199. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at paras 946-47.
200. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 92.
201. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 1019.
202. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 93.
203. Ibid at para 95.
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changes aff ect cost transfers, but not cost savings. Th ey are also grossly 
disproportionate in the sense that government estimates indicate that 
the per capita cost of the IFHP was $552 or roughly 10 percent of the 
per capita cost for health care for Canadians, or 60 cents per taxpayer 
per year.204 As the Applicants contend, “the IFHP spent little on each 
recipient, but delivered crucial, life sustaining benefi ts.”205 Assessing this 
issue under the minimal impairment component of section 1, Mactavish 
J had found that there was “no reliable evidence” before the Court “of the 
extent to which the 2012 changes to the IFHP will, on their own, result 
in cost savings at the federal level.”206 
A fi nal objective was that the changes were meant to “safeguard public 
health and safety.”207 But given the reduced scope of health coverage for 
many groups that may carry a wide range of illnesses, including mental 
illnesses, this goal would seem to be undermined by the changes rather 
than supported. Moreover, operational changes to the administration 
of the IFHP may lead to delays in providing eligibility certifi cates to 
new arrivals who may have communicable diseases, thus reducing 
public safety.208 In her treatment of this issue under section 1, Mactavish 
J concurred: deterring DCO migrants from seeking or obtaining 
healthcare, she found, “potentially jeopardize[s] public health.”209
Th e Applicants also argue that the possibility of discretionary relief 
under the plan – a possibility preserved in the 2012 IFHP – does not 
rectify the deprivation of rights explored earlier. First, the discretion to 
raise a person’s status from the third or fourth to the second tier would 
still leave him or her without coverage for essential medication for any 
condition that is non-communicable.210 More to the point, discretion is 
practically moot given that in many cases, care is needed urgently and 
discretionary coverage is time consuming and involves a bureaucratic 
204. Ibid.
205. Ibid.
206. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 1012.
207. Backgrounder to the Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, 
2012, supra note 106.
208. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 97.
209. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 954.
210. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 99.
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process that is “opaque, unpublicized, [and] paper-driven.”211 
In summary, we have argued in this part of the paper that the facts 
in the current challenge to the revised IFHP render this case better suited 
than any earlier jurisprudence to the Gosselin test for a positive state duty 
under the Charter. But we note that the Gosselin test runs counter to a 
considerable body of Charter case law – both before and since Gosselin 
– refl ecting a deep resistance to a positive interpretation of rights. As 
Martha Jackman writes:
Since the inception of the Charter, judges in Canada have, with rare exceptions, 
adopted a deferential, negative rights based approach to socio- economic 
rights, including the right to health care. In clear contradiction of Canada’s 
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and other international human rights treaties, they have frequently 
held that governments have no affi  rmative duty to ensure that individuals, 
particularly those who are members of socially or economically disadvantaged 
groups, do in fact have the means to enjoy Charter rights to life, liberty, security 
of the person and equality.212
Th is tendency may well extend to the fi nal disposition in the present 
case. We anticipate that at the Federal Court of Appeal, there will be 
a strong impetus to apply the law on section 7 as presently confi gured, 
limiting its application to instances where access to health care is hindered 
(rather than where coverage is not provided). In one sense, this would 
be a simple function of stare decisis.213 But it would also refl ect a lack 
211. Ibid. As the Applicants note, as of September 2013, no information 
had been published about how to apply for discretionary coverage, 
what criteria would be used to assess the application, and no reasons 
were required for a decision. Th e Applicants draw an apt comparison 
here between discretionary coverage under the IFHP and the hospital 
committee process for approving access to abortions under the Criminal 
Code regime challenged in Morgentaler, supra note 146. Th e Supreme 
Court in that case held, at 72, that the scheme was “manifestly unfair” in 
relation to the stated objective of the legislation (providing a “procedural 
structure for bringing into operation a particular defence to criminal 
liability”). 
212. Martha Jackman, “Charter Review As a Health Care Accountability 
Mechanism in Canada” (2010) 18 Health LJ at 27. 
213. In Tanudjaja v Attorney General (Canada) (Application), supra note 15, 
the Ontario Superior Court summarily dismissed a claim under section 7 
of a positive state duty for housing benefi ts primarily on the basis of the 
weight of authority against such an application of the Charter. 
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of clarity as to how lower courts should apply the test contemplated in 
Gosselin. In the absence of greater clarity as to when a case meets the test 
of “special circumstances” that merit a fi nding of a positive state duty 
under section 7, as McLachlin CJC had contemplated, the question may 
need to return to the Supreme Court of Canada for further clarifi cation.
C.  Section 12
Section 12 of the Charter states that “everyone has the right not to be 
subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”214 Th e 
Applicants in Canadian Doctors argued that the changes to the IFHP 
resulted in a denial of “life sustaining health care” that constituted a form 
of “cruel and unusual treatment” under section 12. Th e government 
submitted that while the IFHP may provide for healthcare “treatment,” 
migrants were not “subjected” to the program and section 12 is concerned 
only with “mandatory matters imposed by the state.”215 Th e government 
also argued that the IFHP “does not prevent anyone from obtaining 
medical care: rather it off ers and funds some health services for eligible 
benefi ciaries, who can access them if they choose, at state expense.”216
Justice Mactavish began by noting that most section 12 jurisprudence 
concerned punishment rather than treatment, with limited authority 
as to the scope of “treatment” for the purposes of that section.217 But 
as Mactavish J noted, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez218 affi  rmed the 
possibility that “treatment” could include “that imposed by the state 
in contexts other than that of a penal or quasi-penal nature.”219 In 
considering the meaning of “treatment” under section 12 in a challenge to 
section 241(b) of the Criminal Code, which prohibits “assisted suicide,”220 
Sopinka J, for the majority in Rodriguez, held: 
Th ere must be some more active state process in operation, involving an 
exercise of state control over the individual, in order for the state action in 
214. Supra note 14.
215. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 574. 
216. Ibid.
217. Ibid at para 578. 
218. Supra note 147.  
219. Ibid at para 182.
220. Ibid. 
393(2015) 1 CJCCL
question, whether it be positive action, inaction or prohibition, to constitute 
“treatment” under s. 12.221 
Drawing on this interpretation, Mactavish J held that while refugee 
claimants are in a distinct situation from that of Ms. Rodriguez, in seeking 
Canada’s protection, claimants are “eff ectively under the administrative 
control of the state.”222 Th eir “rights and opportunities” can be “limited 
in a number of diff erent ways” including their entitlement to benefi ts 
and their claims for protection.223 A further relevant distinction here 
was the fact that whereas Ms. Rodriguez had been subject to a law of 
general application, the decision to amend the IFHP “intentionally 
targeted an admittedly vulnerable, poor and disadvantaged group for 
adverse treatment … for the express purpose of infl icting predictable and 
preventable physical and psychological suff ering.”224 Th e government’s 
actions in both respects brought the IFHP changes within the scope of 
the word “treatment” for the purposes of section 12.
In R v Smith,225 the Supreme Court held that treatment or 
punishment will be found to be “cruel and unusual” under section 12 if 
it is “so excessive as to outrage [our] standards of decency.”226 Among the 
factors to be considered are whether treatment exceeds what is necessary 
to achieve a legitimate purpose, whether there are adequate alternatives, 
whether it accords with public standards, whether it shocks the general 
conscience, and whether it is “unusually severe and hence degrading to 
human dignity and worth.”227 
 When applying the factors to this case, Mactavish J found that 
the amendments to the IFHP have not “achieved a legitimate aim.”228 
221. Ibid. 
222. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 585.
223. Ibid. Justice Mactavish noted that recognizing “treatment” as the 
government decisions to withhold social benefi ts from migrants was 
consistent with foreign jurisprudence, including R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Adam; R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ex parte Limbuela; R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex parte Tesema (Conjoined Appeals) [2005] UKHL 66. 
224. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 587.
225. [1987] 1 SCR 1045.
226. Ibid at para 83. 
227. Ibid at para 44.
228. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 617.
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Th ere was not enough evidence to prove that the changes have deterred 
illegitimate claims or reduced the costs of the program.229 Th ey are also 
“arbitrary,”230 “have limited social value,”231 are highly criticized by key 
stakeholders including provincial governments, medical associations and 
non-governmental organizations,232 and therefore do not “accord with 
public standards of decency and propriety.”233 Signifi cantly, Mactavish J 
found that there was “substantial evidence … not just of philosophical 
diff erences with a government policy choice, but of real outrage on the 
part of informed, aff ected individuals and groups at what has been done 
through the 2012 changes to the IFHP.”234 Th e eff ects were “especially 
evident insofar as they aff ect children.”235 Citing numerous examples 
given in evidence of cases in which children suff ering from serious 
conditions including pneumonia, asthma, and suicidal depression were 
denied care, she held that the amendments to the IFHP “potentially 
jeopardize the health, and indeed the very lives, of these innocent and 
vulnerable children in a manner that shocks the conscience and outrages 
our standards of decency.”236 
Finding a violation of section 12 on the basis of administrative control 
amounting to cruel treatment, Mactavish J off ered a novel basis on which 
to capture the violation of dignity and humanity in this case. Notably, 
it did so in a manner that avoided the thornier debate about whether 
the Charter imposes a positive duty on the part of the state to provide 
a social benefi t. And given the extensive factual fi ndings supporting her 
application of the test in Smith, the holding on section 12 – at least with 
respect to the issue of cruelty – would appear to be on fi rm evidentiary 
ground. 
229. Ibid.
230. Ibid at para 618. 
231. Ibid at para 620.
232. Ibid at para 624. 
233. Ibid at para 635.
234. Ibid.
235. Ibid at para 637.
236. Ibid at para 691. 
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D.  Section 15
Section 15(1) of the Charter states that “[e]very individual is equal before 
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefi t of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age, mental or physical disability.”237 Section 15(2) qualifi es this by 
stating: “[s]ubsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity 
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged 
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.”238 
Th e Applicants in this case argued that the changes to the IFHP have 
created a “health care hierarchy.”239 Contrary to section 15, the 2012 
IFHP discriminates on the basis of (a) national or ethnic origin and (b) 
immigration status.240 It does so on the basis of national or ethnic origin 
by providing a lower level of health care insurance to refugee claimants 
from DCO countries versus those from non-DCO countries.241 And it 
does so on the basis of immigration status by off ering certain migrants 
lesser coverage than those of immigrants or Canadians. For example, 
both individual Applicants, Ayubi and Rodriques, were denied similar 
coverage aff orded to other migrants and Canadians, despite having 
obtained legal status.242 
In response, the government argued that any discriminatory eff ect of 
the cuts was based not on the IFHP but on distinctions among categories 
of migrants in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, including those 
from Designated Countries of Origin.243 Th e government also pointed to 
earlier jurisprudence in which courts have rejected the argument that 
“immigration status” is an analogous ground under section 15 of the 
237. Supra note 14.
238. Ibid, s 15(2). 
239. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 694; Applicants’ Memorandum, 
supra note 18 at para 64.
240. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 696.
241. Ibid. 
242. Ibid. 
243. Ibid at para 699. 
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Charter.244 Moreover, the government submitted, the “right to state-
funded health care”245 is not accessible to all Canadians equally.246 
In R v Kapp247 the Supreme Court held that the purpose of subsection 
15(1) of the Charter is:
[P]reventing governments from making distinctions based on the enumerated 
or analogous grounds that: have the eff ect of perpetuating group disadvantage 
and prejudice; or impose disadvantage on the basis of stereotyping.248 
In Quebec (AG) v A,249 the Supreme Court set out a two-part test for 
establishing a section 15 violation. Challengers must show that 
i. the law creates a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous   
 ground, and
ii. the distinction creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or   
 stereotyping.250
Th e analysis underlying the test considers whether the state action has 
a “discriminatory impact”251 and whether “the state conduct widens the 
gap between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society, 
rather than narrowing it.”252 
Justice Mactavish dismissed the claim that the revised IFHP 
discriminated on the basis of immigration status, but held that it did 
violate section 15(1) on the basis of national origin.253 Th e IFHP drew 
a distinction between refugee claimants from DCO countries and those 
from other countries, limiting the former to “Public Health or Public 
Safety (PHPS) benefi ts.”254 Her analysis relied in part on Eldridge v British 
Columbia (Attorney General),255 in which the Supreme Court held that 
the state does not have to provide any particular social benefi t; but if a 
244. Ibid at para 702.
245. Ibid at para 703. 
246. Ibid.
247. 2008 SCC 41 [emphasis removed]. 
248. Ibid at para 25. 
249. 2013 SCC 5.
250. Ibid at para 162. 
251. Ibid at para 332.
252. Ibid.
253. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 696.
254. Ibid at para 735.
255. Supra note 173.
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government chooses to provide a benefi t, “it is obliged to do so in a non-
discriminatory manner.”256 Th e Court in Eldridge further reasoned that 
“in many circumstances, this will require governments to take positive 
action, for example by extending the scope of a benefi t to a previously 
excluded class of persons.”257 
Justice Mactavish also dismissed the government’s argument 
that the “IFHP is an ameliorative program directed at improving the 
situation of groups that are in need of assistance in order to enhance 
substantive equality.”258 Th e government had contended that the purpose 
of the distinctions drawn by the 2012 IFHP were in part to assist 
refugee claimants by allocating more funding to migrants whose claims 
have longer processing times and therefore stay in Canada for longer 
periods.259 Th e government relied on this approach to section 15(2) in 
Alberta (Aboriginal Aff airs and Northern Development) v Cunningham,260 
in which the Supreme Court held that “[a]meliorative programs, by their 
nature, confer benefi ts on one group that are not conferred on others.”261 
Th ere will not be a violation of subsection 1(2) “if they serve or advance 
the object of the program, thus promoting substantive equality.”262 But 
Mactavish J rejected the claim that increasing processing times for some 
migrants would advance the goal of substantive equality – since shorter 
processing times for refugee claimants from DCO countries will entail 
inequalities in health coverage and other discriminatory eff ects.263 As 
Mactavish J noted, “[i]t does not follow that a refugee claimant from 
Mexico (a DCO country) who arrives in Canada about to give birth 
necessarily requires less health care than does a pregnant refugee claimant 
who has to come to Canada from Sri Lanka (a non-DCO country).”264
By drawing a distinction between the level of health care insurance 
coverage provided to DCO countries versus non-DCO countries, 
256. Ibid at para 73.
257. Ibid.
258. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 779.
259. Ibid at para 780.
260. 2011 SCC 37.
261. Ibid at para 53. 
262. Ibid. 
263. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 796.
264. Ibid at para 804.
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the 2012 IFHP was also found to perpetuate a prejudice in the form 
of depriving coverage from seriously ill claimants,265 and it was found 
that the discrimination against DCO claimants “perpetuates negative 
attitudes about them.”266 Th e denial of health insurance coverage 
continues to enhance the marginalization faced by refugee claimants 
from DCO countries such as the Roma from Hungary and the LGBTQ 
communities in Mexico.267 
E.  Section 1
In light of the fi nding that changes to the IFHP violate sections 12 and 
15 of the Charter, the Court in Canadian Doctors had to assess whether 
the violation constitutes a reasonable limit on the rights in accordance 
with section 1 of the Charter. To meet this test, the government had the 
onus of establishing, fi rst, that the impugned measure has a pressing and 
substantial objective, and second, that it meets a general proportionality 
test.268 At this second stage, the court must assess whether the objective 
bears a rational connection to the chosen measure, whether the measure 
minimally impairs the violated rights, and whether the deleterious eff ects 
of the program are proportionate to its salutary objectives, thus justifying 
the limit on the rights in question.269 If appellate courts uphold the 
fi ndings that Charter rights have been violated in this case, Mactavish J’s 
factual fi ndings supporting her analysis under section 1 will be relevant 
on appeal. 
Justice Mactavish identifi ed the objectives of the revised 2012 IFHP 
by citing a press release accompanying the announcement of the changes 
in April of 2012.270 Th ese included “cost containment,” “fairness to 
Canadian taxpayers,” “the protection of public health and safety,” and 
the need to defend the “integrity of Canada’s immigration system.”271 
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) 
265. Ibid at para 813.
266. Ibid at para 830.
267. Ibid at para 837.
268. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 138-39. 
269. Ibid at 139. 
270. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 892. 
271. Ibid. 
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v NAPE,272 Mactavish J noted that while cost alone would not ordinarily 
constitute a pressing and substantive objective, it may when “wrapped 
up with other public policy considerations,”273 as was the case here. She 
found that “fairness to Canadians” might also have constituted a pressing 
and substantial objective, but found that a lack of fairness to Canadians 
with respect to the pre-2012 IFHP had not been established.274 It was 
implausible, in her view, to suggest that the earlier framework was unfair to 
working Canadians because migrants under that framework had received 
benefi ts such as eye and dental care that were only available to Canadians 
on social assistance. Given their indigent status and precarious position 
as refugees or migrants, and their willingness to abide by immigration 
and refugee laws, the provision of benefi ts to these individuals was not 
unfair.275 Protecting public health and safety was found to be a pressing 
and substantial objective, and in light of evidence of abuse of the refugee 
system, so too was the goal of protecting the integrity of Canada’s 
immigration system.276
Moving to the rational connection test, Mactavish J agreed there 
was a reasonable connection between the withdrawal of coverage to 
certain classes of migrants under the new framework and the goal of 
reducing costs to the program.277 But given her earlier fi nding of a lack 
of unfairness to Canadians in the earlier coverage under the program, 
she found no rational connection between the removal of coverage and 
the goal of addressing the alleged unfairness. As she put it, Canadians 
are “not treated any more fairly because refugee claimants from DCO 
countries, and failed refugee claimants who are still in compliance with 
Canadian immigration and refugee laws, are now denied any health 
insurance coverage whatsoever.”278 She also found that although aspects 
of the new scheme bore a rational connection to the goal of protecting 
public health and safety, removing all coverage from persons in the 
272. 2004 SCC 66.
273. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 909, citing ibid at para 69.  
274. Ibid at para 912. 
275. Ibid at paras 913-21. 
276. Ibid at paras 929-32. 
277. Ibid at para 945. 
278. Ibid at para 949. 
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fourth tier – including coverage for conditions that pose a risk to public 
health and safety – removed any rational connection to the stated goal 
with respect to this aspect of the plan.279 Finally, Mactavish J refused 
to recognize a rational connection between the new plan and the goal 
of protecting the integrity of the immigration system by virtue of the 
lack of evidence that changes to coverage remove a material incentive 
to illegitimate claimants or that the changes will encourage the quicker 
departure of failed claimants.280   
Given her fi nding that the objectives of fairness to Canadians and 
protecting public health and safety were not substantial and not rationally 
connected to the IFHP in at least one case, Mactavish J found that the 
revised plan also failed the minimal impairment test in those respects.281 
However, she also found that it failed the minimal impairment test 
in seeking to advance the goals of cost containment and protecting 
the integrity of the immigration system. Although she accepted the 
government’s evidence that changes to the plan would result in the 
“substantial” savings of $70 million in the fi rst three years of the new 
program and $15 million each year after that, it was not clear that “the 
anticipated reduction in program spending is entirely, or even primarily, 
attributable to the 2012 changes to the IFHP.”282 In light of the fact that 
other recent legislation including the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, 283 the 
Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act,284 and the Faster Removal of 
Foreign Criminals Act,285 have helped speed up the refugee determination 
process and deterred abuse of the system, the government had failed to 
prove what cost savings were due to the IFHP changes in particular. She 
concluded on this point that there was “no reliable evidence before this 
Court of the extent to which the 2012 changes to the IFHP will, on their 
own, result in cost savings at the federal level.”286 But even if there were 
279. Ibid at para 962. 
280. Ibid at paras 964-70. 
281. Ibid at para 994. 
282. Ibid at para 999. 
283. SC 2010, c 8. 
284. SC 2012, c 17. 
285. SC 2013, c 16. 
286. Canadian Doctors, supra note 17 at para 1012. 
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such evidence, it would be necessary to establish that those savings could 
not have been obtained in a less infringing manner.287 Th e Applicants, 
however, were able to point to at least two less infringing measures that 
helped save costs in a “real and substantial manner” – the recent return 
to a full complement of adjudicators at the Immigration and Refugee 
Board, and carrying out speedier removals once claims are rejected, both 
resulting in shorter eligibility periods under the IFHP.288 Finally, given 
her fi nding that the government had failed to establish that the 2012 
changes had removed an incentive for persons from Designated Countries 
of Origin to make illegitimate claims, and that this very assumption was 
based on subjective “perceptions” and “beliefs,” Mactavish J held that the 
government had not met the burden of proving that there were no less 
infringing ways of protecting the integrity of the immigration system.289
 Justice Mactavish then considered whether the 2012 changes to the 
IFHP were proportionate in their deleterious eff ects to the program’s 
salutary goals, and whether attaining these goals outweighed the breach 
of the rights at issue.290 She made the signifi cant fi ndings that the revised 
IFHP was “causing signifi cant suff ering to an already vulnerable, poor 
and disadvantaged population,” and that the changes are “causing illness, 
disability, and death.”291 Th e eff ects are both serious in terms of their 
quality and quantity, being felt “by a signifi cant number of individuals, 
given the thousands of people who come to the country each year, seeking 
its protection.”292 Th e salutary objectives of the IFHP do not outweigh its 
deleterious eff ects for various reasons.293 Removing coverage from those 
seeking a PRRA and who might pose a risk to public health or safety did 
nothing to advance the goal of protecting public health. Given that the 
earlier plan was not unfair to Canadians, the objective of being fairer to 
Canadians could not be said to outweigh the deleterious eff ects of the 
new plan. With no clear indication of how much money the program is 
287. Ibid at para 1013. 
288. Ibid at paras 1014-15. 
289. Ibid at paras 1018-27. 
290. Ibid at para 1044. 
291. Ibid at paras 1048-49. 
292. Ibid at para 1050. 
293. Ibid at paras 1052-74. 
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saving the federal government – and the fact that there is still a “real cost 
to Canadian taxpayers to providing [various] alternative forms of health 
care” to which migrants are forced to turn, it is also not possible to say 
that cost of benefi ts outweigh the deleterious eff ects.294 Finally, lacking 
evidence that health coverage was a source of abuse of the system on the 
part of claimants from Designated Countries of Origin, it was not clear 
that the integrity objective outweighed the suff ering of migrants deprived 
of benefi ts. Th e revised IFHP had failed to be justifi ed under section 1 
and was therefore not a reasonable limit on sections 12 and 15 in this 
case.295 
F.  International Humanitarian Law and Norms
Th e current challenge to the constitutional validity of the 2012 changes 
to the IFHP also involves a consideration of Canada’s commitments 
under international human rights law. As Martha Jackman has noted, 
although Canada has ratifi ed various treaties containing health-related 
protections, these have not been explicitly recognized in Canadian law 
and do not off er a basis for granting remedies for rights violations. 296 
Yet, as Jackman also notes, the Supreme Court has affi  rmed in Baker, 297 
Canadian Foundation, 298 and Hape299 that international human rights 
law may serve as a guide for interpreting Charter rights as well as 
domestic law and policy, giving rise to a preference for applications of 
the law that are consistent with the values and principles in treaties and 
covenants at issue.300 Th e parties in this case debate the scope and proper 
294. Ibid at para 1061. 
295. Ibid at para 1087 (Justice Mactavish declared the 2012 IFHP orders in 
council invalid pursuant to s 52 of Th e Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, but since those OICs 
had repealed the pre-2012 IFHP, she suspended the operation of the 
declaration for 4 months. Th e Attorney General has fi led a Notice of 
Appeal). 
296. Jackman, “Th e Implications of Section 7”, supra note 128 at 12.
297. Baker v Canada (Minister of Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker].
298. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney 
General), [2004] 1 SCR 76 [Canadian Foundation].
299. R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26. 
300. Baker, supra note 297 at para 70; Canadian Foundation, supra note 298 at 
para 31; Hape, ibid at paras 53, 56, 68.
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application of treaty rights to refugee health coverage in Canada, a debate 
that was not resolved in Mactavish J’s treatment of international law in 
Canadian Doctors.301 Justice Mactavish conceded that relevant portions 
of international law cited by the Applicants have not been incorporated 
into Canadian law and lacked the force of law, but she acknowledged 
the role of international law as an interpretative aid to Charter rights and 
drew on that law for this purpose.302 What follows is a brief overview of 
provisions that Mactavish J considered and additional relevant provisions 
of international law.
Th e Applicants highlighted two sources of confl ict between the new 
IFHP and the provisions of the 1951 Vienna Convention – a primary 
source for international refugee law. 303 Article 3 of the Convention 
requires that contracting states “apply the provisions of this Convention 
to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of 
origin.”304 Th is would appear to prohibit the IFHP’s diff erential coverage 
of claimants from DCO countries as a form of discrimination based 
on country of origin.305 Similarly, Article 7 states that “[e]xcept where 
this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a Contracting 
State shall accord refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens 
generally.”306 Prior to the changes in 2012, refugees received comparable 
coverage to that available to other immigrants, permanent resident 
holders, and temporary residents, including students or foreign workers. 
Th e changes to the IFHP now set apart certain refugees from other 
immigrants in terms of health coverage.307
Th e Applicants also invoked the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,308 which Canada ratifi ed in 1992. Article 6(2) calls upon signatory 
states to “ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and 
301. Supra note 17 at paras 441-75. 
302. Ibid at para 474. 
303. UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 
July 1951, 189 UNTS 137.
304. Ibid.
305. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 142.
306. Supra note 303.
307. Applicants’ Memorandum, supra note 18 at para 149.
308. 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, 28 ILM 1456, (entered into force 2 
September 1990).
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development of the child.”309 Article 2(1) calls upon parties to “respect 
and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child 
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective 
of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, property, disability, birth or other status.”310 And fi nally, Article 
3(1) of the Convention states that “[i]n all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts 
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration.”311
Justice Mactavish also noted the European Union’s Reception 
Directive of 2013, which details standards in that jurisdiction for the 
“reception of applicants for international protection.”312 Article 19 of 
the Directive requires Member States to “ensure that applicants receive 
the necessary health care which shall include, at least, emergency care 
and essential treatment of illnesses and of serious mental disorders.”313 
Article 21, dealing with “vulnerable persons” more generally, mandates 
that states must 
take into account the specifi c situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, 
unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, 
single parents with minor children, victims of human traffi  cking, persons with 
serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who have been 
subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or 
sexual violence …314
While this latter provision contemplates a softer form of protection, 
both articles set out standards that clearly prohibit the discriminatory 
treatment contemplated in the 2012 IFHP regime.
Martha Jackman has highlighted two further international human 
rights instruments that support a rights-based approach to improving 
309. Ibid.
310. Ibid.
311. Ibid.
312. EC, Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for 
internal protection (recast), [2013] OJ, L180/96.
313. Ibid.
314. Ibid. 
405(2015) 1 CJCCL
healthcare access.315 Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including 
… medical care.”316 Ratifi ed by Canada in 1978, the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights relates implicitly to 
health care coverage in two of its articles.317 Article 12(1) sets out “the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”318 Article 12(2)(d) calls upon signatories to 
the Covenant to take necessary measures to “assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness.”319
V.  Conclusion
Changes in 2012 to health care coverage for refugees and other migrants 
have marked a signifi cant departure from earlier levels of coverage, with 
profound practical consequences for migrants dealing with a wide range 
of critical conditions. Th e changes to coverage have also, for the most 
part, set Canada apart from the approach taken in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia, and raise questions in relation to 
Canada’s obligations under international human rights law. In Canadian 
Doctors, the Federal Court held that the revised plan violates sections 
12 and 15 of the Charter and the violations cannot be justifi ed under 
section 1. However, the Court declined to fi nd a violation of section 7 
on the basis of a reluctance to recognize a positive duty on the part of the 
state to provide healthcare benefi ts under the Charter. An appeal of this 
decision is pending, giving rise to the possibility of revisiting the issue of 
a positive duty under section 7. Th is article has argued that while earlier 
courts have been consistently reluctant to recognize such a duty, the facts 
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at 110. 
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in the present case off er a compelling and unique basis for doing so. 
Whatever the outcome of this case, however, the current challenge to the 
constitutionality of the IFHP represents a kind of limit case – combining 
some of the most vulnerable claimants in some of the most desperate 
situations – thus promising to lend greater clarity as to the possible scope 
of the Charter as a tool for protecting fundamental socio-economic and 
human rights.
